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Merger litigation has changed dramatically. Today, nearly 
every announcement of a significant merger sparks litigation, 
and these cases look quite different from merger cases in the past.  
These cases are now filed primarily outside of Delaware, they 
typically settle without shareholders receiving any financial 
consideration, and corporate boards now have far more ex ante 
power to shape these cases. Although these changes are often 
heralded as unprecedented, they are not. Over the past several 
decades, derivative suits experienced many of the same changes.  
This Article explores the similarities between the recent changes 
in merger litigation and the longer history of derivative suits.  
The trajectories of these lawsuits are not identical, but they 
nonetheless suggest larger lessons about shareholder litigation, 
including the predictable ways in which agency costs play out in 
the courtroom and at the settlement table. By uncovering the lost 
lessons of derivative suits, corporate law can finally tackle the 
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I.  Introduction 
Merger litigation has changed in unprecedented ways. Just 
fifteen years ago, it was relatively rare for shareholders to file 
class actions to challenge mergers and acquisitions.1 Today, 
these suits are ubiquitous,2 and they look different than they 
ever did in the past. The settlements in these suits have 
changed. Shareholders no longer receive any money from most 
 
1. See Matthew D. Cain et al., Essay, The Shifting Tides of Merger 
Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 621 tbl.1 (2018) (presenting data illustrating 
that, in 2005, only thirty-seven percent of mergers involving U.S. public 
companies with a transaction size of at least $100 million were challenged in 
court).   
2. See id. (stating that 85 percent of mergers meeting this definition 
were challenged in 2017). 
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settlements of these cases, with most instead involving 
additional disclosures that are of little value.3 The forums have 
changed. Merger cases used to be filed in Delaware and other 
state courts,4 but they fled to federal court after Delaware 
started to crack down on them.5 And the power of corporate 
boards has changed. Delaware now gives corporate boards 
enhanced powers to control these suits through the adoption of 
procedural rules in corporations’ governing documents.6 
Corporate law has never seen anything like this. 
Except that it has. Decades before these transformations 
began in merger litigation, derivative suits experienced many of 
these same changes.7 Indeed, the similarities between the 
history of derivative suits and the more recent changes in 
merger litigation are striking. In derivative suits, for example, 
as in merger litigation, the case rarely ends with the plaintiff 
receiving any money as part of the settlement.8 Instead, 
nonmonetary settlements where the corporation promises to 
make certain corporate governance reforms are far more 
common.9 Similarly, just like in merger litigation, derivative 
suits used to be filed primarily in state court,10 but they are now 
more commonly filed in federal court.11 And just as Delaware 
 
3. See id. at 623 tbl.3 (finding that 90 percent of merger settlements in 
2017 were disclosure-only). 
4. See id. at 621 tbl.1 (illustrating that only 7 percent of merger cases in 
2005 were filed in federal court). 
5. See id. (highlighting that 87 percent of merger cases in 2017 were 
filed in federal court). 
6. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559 (Del. 
2014) (declaring that the boards of Delaware corporations can include new 
procedural rules to govern fiduciary duty claims filed by their shareholders as 
long as these rules were adopted “for a proper purpose”). 
 7. See generally Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the 
Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010) 
[hereinafter Erickson I] (presenting an empirical examination of shareholder 
derivative suits in the federal courts).   
 8. See id. at 1754 (“Remarkably few of the [derivative] suits in my study 
ended with the corporation receiving a meaningful financial benefit.”). 
 9. See id. at 1754–55 (explaining that modern settlement agreements 
often lack recompense but instead include certain actions that must be 
completed by the board). 
 10. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 11. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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now gives corporate boards more power to rein in merger 
litigation, Delaware has long given corporate boards the power 
to limit derivative suits, through both the demand requirement 
and special litigation committees.12 When it comes to 
shareholder litigation, history is repeating itself. 
The irony is that few have noticed. Scholars have long noted 
the common entrepreneurial roots of different types of 
shareholder litigation,13 but these suits are otherwise analyzed 
within their own silos.14 As a result, as merger litigation 
changed dramatically, few recognized the similarities to the 
earlier history of derivative suits. 
These similarities matter because they reveal larger 
lessons about shareholder litigation. First, the similarities 
illustrate that the disclosure-only settlements in merger 
settlements are not a wholly new development. They are instead 
a variation on the nonmonetary settlements that have long been 
common in corporate law.15 Viewed as a whole, these 
settlements illustrate how the agency costs inherent in 
representative litigation can impact negotiations at the 
settlement table.16 Recognizing the common features of 
nonmonetary settlements in these different types of cases will 
 
 12. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 13. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ 
Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis 
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (“[P]laintiffs’ 
class and derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear 
a substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary control 
over all important decisions in the lawsuit.”). 
 14. Compare Cain et al., supra note 1, at 610–30 (analyzing data on 
merger class actions), with Erickson, supra note 7, at 1760–80 (analyzing data 
on derivative suits). Indeed, the more recent articles discussing both types of 
litigation focus on their differences. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Correcting 
Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine 
on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 47 (2015) (“Corporate benefit should be returned to 
its doctrinal origins—the derivative suit—and no longer recognized as a 
justification for fee awards in the class action context.”). 
 15. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Jessica Erickson, The Gatekeepers of Shareholder Litigation, 70 
OKLA. L. REV. 237, 243–45 (2017) [hereinafter Erickson II] (explaining the risk 
of attorneys and defendants settling to benefit themselves at the expense of 
the shareholders). 
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also make it easier to recognize whatever variation of these 
settlements appears in the future.17 
Second, the similarities demonstrate the limitations of 
relying on any one court to police shareholder lawsuits. The 
Delaware Court of Chancery has played a key role in overseeing 
shareholder litigation, helping to ensure that shareholders can 
hold corporate managers accountable for their misdeeds in court 
while keeping the agency costs of these suits in check.18 Yet, in 
both merger litigation and derivative suits, shareholders left the 
Delaware Court of Chancery for federal court, at least in part to 
avoid the scrutiny of Delaware judges.19 This forum shopping 
illustrates that Delaware alone cannot solve the problems with 
shareholder litigation. 
Finally, the similarities expose the dangers of relying on 
corporate boards to oversee shareholder lawsuits. Given the 
bedrock principle that corporate boards oversee the business 
and affairs of corporations,20 it is not surprising that courts have 
looked for ways to allow boards to exercise oversight over 
shareholder lawsuits, either through the adoption of new rules 
to govern these suits in corporate bylaws and charters or 
through procedures such as the demand requirement and 
special litigation committees (SLC).21 Yet the legal system has 
never fully grappled with the conflicts of interests that arise 
when directors’ power extends to claims that may someday be 
filed against them.22 
 
 17. See infra Part IV.A. 
 18. See E. Norman Veasey & Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate 
Litigation in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131, 141 (2000) 
(“For the past 100 years, [Delaware] has been the laboratory where our most 
fundamental concepts of corporate governance have been developed and 
refined.”). 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
 20. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019) (“The business and affairs 
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of the board of directors . . . .”). 
 21. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (stating 
that the purpose of the demand requirement is to allow the board to adjudge 
whether a derivative suit would be detrimental to the company). 
 22. Cf. Amy Simmerman, Brad Sorrels & Lori Will, Year in Review: 
Delaware Corporate Law and Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
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This Article examines the lost lessons of shareholder 
litigation by analyzing the similar evolution of merger litigation 
and derivative suits. Part II explores how these lawsuits appear 
to be quite different, despite their common entrepreneurial 
roots. Part III then turns to the hidden similarities between 
these lawsuits, examining their common experiences with 
nonmonetary settlements, forum shopping, and director 
oversight. Part IV steps back and analyzes the broader lessons 
from these similarities. 
To be clear, the point of this Article is not that these 
different types of shareholder litigation have followed identical 
trajectories. There are a number of important differences. The 
rise of merger litigation, for example, was quite sudden as was 
its later flight to federal court,23 while derivative suits evolved 
more slowly and without nearly as much public attention.24 
These suits also address different types of misconduct and are 
brought on behalf of different parties,25 so the comparison can 
only go so far. Yet by stepping back and analyzing their 
similarities, we can glean broader insight into the lost lessons 
of shareholder litigation. 
II.  The Different Paths of Shareholder Litigation 
Corporate law has long offered shareholders a variety of 
litigation options to police the behavior of corporate managers.26 
These lawsuits are typically representative suits—derivative 
suits, for example, are filed on behalf of plaintiff corporations, 
while merger lawsuits are filed on behalf of a shareholder 
class.27 The representative nature of these suits means that the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys have more power than in typical litigation, 
 
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/2565-EYSU (critiquing the 
traditional efficacy of SLCs while also noting that the Court of Chancery has 
recently shifted from a trend of deference to allowing some plaintiffs to proceed 
depending on the severity of the underlying complaint). 
 23. See infra Parts II.B, III.B. 
 24. See infra Parts II.B, III.B. 
 25. See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 237–38 (listing the various ways 
shareholders can redress corporate misconduct). 
 27. See id. at 241 (discussing shareholder lawsuits). 
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which can lead to abuses.28 This Part first examines the common 
entrepreneurial roots of derivative suits and merger litigation 
before turning to how these similarities have nonetheless led to 
very different historical trajectories for the two types of 
lawsuits. 
A.   Common Entrepreneurial Roots 
Shareholder derivative suits address different types of 
corporate governance challenges, which can easily mask their 
similarities. Shareholder derivative suits are brought on behalf 
of a plaintiff corporation,29 and any recovery from the litigation 
goes to the corporation itself, rather than to the shareholders.30 
In contrast, merger lawsuits are typically class actions,31 with 
one or more shareholders filing the litigation on behalf of a class 
of shareholders.32 Any recovery from these lawsuits goes 
directly to the shareholders.33 
Despite these differences, however, derivative suits and 
merger litigation share common entrepreneurial roots that 
distinguish them from traditional civil litigation. In most civil 
cases, the parties have a direct financial interest in the 
 
 28. See id. at 242–45 (explaining the possible abuses of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in shareholder lawsuits). 
 29. See John Matheson, Restoring the Promise of the Shareholder 
Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV. 327, 344 (2016) (“A derivative action allows 
shareholders to bring a suit against directors or officers in the name of the 
corporation itself.”). 
 30. See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of 
Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 81 (2008) [hereinafter 
Erickson III] (“Any recovery in a derivative suit is returned to the 
corporation.”). 
 31. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of 
Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
133, 135 (2004) [hereinafter Thompson & Thomas I] (describing this category 
of litigation as “class action lawsuits filed under state law challenging director 
conduct in mergers and acquisitions”). 
 32. See Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to Disclosure 
Settlements: A How-to Guide, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 281, 292 (2017) (discussing the 
definition of the settlement class in merger lawsuits). 
 33. Cf. Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in 
Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. 
L. REV. 557, 566 (2015) (referring to the slim likelihood that the plaintiff class 
will recover money in a merger lawsuit). 
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litigation because their money is on the line.34 As a result, they 
have an incentive to monitor their attorney and make sure that 
the attorney is acting in their best interest.35 This incentive to 
monitor allows the legal system to take a more hands off 
approach to these cases, respecting the parties’ decisions 
regarding the course of the litigation as long as they comply with 
generally applicable rules.36 
Shareholder litigation, however, is primarily 
representative litigation, which means that the true parties in 
interest do not control the litigation.37 Instead, one or more 
shareholder plaintiffs represent the corporation or a broader 
class of shareholders.38 In theory, these representative plaintiffs 
should monitor the litigation, ensuring that their attorneys act 
in the best interest of the true parties in interest.39 Yet 
representative plaintiffs only receive their pro rata share of any 
 
 34. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 241 (“[In most cases,] a client can 
monitor his or her attorney’s decisions, questioning those that do not appear 
to be in the client’s best interests and ultimately firing the attorney if the 
client’s wishes are not followed.”); Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 
WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 390 (2011) (“Unlike individual private cases, like a 
contract dispute, aggregate and derivative parties cannot simply settle the 
case and dismiss their claims.”). 
 35. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 241 (“Whether the case is a 
multi-million dollar securities class action or a run-of-the-mill negligence case, 
there is always a concern that a lawyer will act in his or her own best interests 
rather than in the interests of the client.”). 
 36. See id. (providing a practical example of how agency costs are reduced 
in certain classes of lawsuits). 
 37. See Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 31, at 148 (highlighting that 
representative litigation spreads risk across individual shareholders therefore 
lessening the marginal benefit for additional cost of monitoring attorneys). 
 38. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: 
LAW & PRACTICE § 1:1 (2020) 
A derivative suit differs in a fundamental respect from a class 
action brought by a corporation’s shareholders. Both are 
representative actions, but the claims asserted in a derivative suit 
are those of the corporation, while the claims asserted in a class 
action are individual claims of injury suffered by the shareholders 
themselves. 
 39. See Erickson  II, supra note 16, at 241 (explaining that, in more 
traditional litigation, plaintiff’s take a more active role in monitoring their 
attorneys). 
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settlement in a class action.40 In a derivative suit, their financial 
stake is even more attenuated because any recovery goes to the 
corporation and therefore the corporation’s shareholders only 
benefit indirectly from the litigation.41 As a result, in both 
merger litigation and derivative suits, representative plaintiffs 
often do not have sufficient financial interest to effectively 
monitor their attorneys.42 
This financial reality leads to plaintiffs’ attorneys often 
having a far greater investment in the litigation than the 
representative plaintiffs.43 This investment means that the 
attorneys typically control the litigation, with the 
representative plaintiff serving only a nominal role. In this way, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are like litigation entrepreneurs, deciding 
what claims to file and making nearly all of the decisions related 
to the litigation.44 In the words of Professor John Coffee, the 
reality is that “class actions and other representative 
actions . . . are largely lawyer financed, lawyer controlled, and 
lawyer settled, subject to generally weak client control and only 
modest oversight by courts.”45 
This situation creates obvious and oft-discussed agency 
costs. Without significant control by their clients, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys can make decisions that benefit themselves at the 
 
 40. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The 
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through 
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 701 (1986) (“[In a 
derivative suit,] the recovery goes not to the shareholder plaintiff, but to the 
corporation.”). 
 41. See id. (“[T]he actual plaintiffs benefit only to the extent of their pro 
rata interest in the corporation.”). 
 42. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 242 (“The shareholder plaintiff 
incurs all of the costs of monitoring the attorney, but receives only a fraction 
of the benefits.”). 
 43. See Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 31, at 148 (“Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
are the dominant players in representative shareholder litigation, whether 
derivative actions, securities fraud class actions, or state acquisition-oriented 
class actions.”). 
 44. See Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 3 (“[P]laintiffs’ class and 
derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a 
substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary control 
over all important decisions in the lawsuit.”). 
 45. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, 
AND FUTURE 5 (2015). 
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expense of these clients, acting more like principals than legal 
agents or fiduciaries. These attorneys can, for example, make 
trade-offs in settlement negotiations that leave more money in 
their own pockets.46 They can also choose to abandon 
positive-value claims and put their resources into other cases 
that offer higher possible payouts.47 
To be clear, these economic incentives do not always lead to 
outcomes that are bad for shareholders.48 In some cases, 
representative plaintiffs have a significant financial stake in the 
litigation and therefore greater incentives to monitor their 
attorneys.49 And just because these attorneys sometimes have 
the ability to prioritize their own financial interest does not 
mean that they will do so. Moral and ethical constraints will 
often temper the financial conflicts in these cases. Nonetheless, 
entrepreneurial litigation deviates from the traditional models 
of litigation in ways that necessitate greater attention and 
oversight.50 
B.  Different Historical Trajectories 
Although derivative suits and merger litigation have 
common entrepreneurial roots, they have had very different 
 
 46. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 242 (“[R]educed monitoring in 
shareholder litigation can increase agency costs by allowing attorneys to seek 
a higher percentage of the recovery for their fee.”). 
 47. See id. at 242–43 (providing a quantitative example of this principle 
in action). 
 48. See Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using 
Data Points of Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool for Reform, 72 BUS. 
LAW. 623, 623–26 (2017) (arguing that commentators need to remember “the 
existence of a parallel universe of stockholder deal litigation that does not fit” 
the traditional narrative about shareholder litigation); Jessica Erickson, The 
(Un)changing Derivative Suit, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 58, 64 (Sean Griffith, et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter 
Erickson IV] (“Shareholder derivative suits have shone in addressing 
particular types of corporate misconduct, most recently the backdating of stock 
options.”). 
 49. See generally James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff 
Matter: An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (2006) (illustrating that lead institutional plaintiffs 
often have significant stakes in the litigation). 
 50. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 245 (arguing for the implementation 
of gatekeepers for shareholder litigation). 
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historical trajectories. Derivative suits are one of the oldest 
forms of shareholder litigation, recognized by courts as early as 
1830.51 In their early years, corporations were in favor of 
derivative suits because they could use these suits to create 
federal diversity jurisdiction and bring their business disputes 
into federal court.52 Even after courts put a stop to these tactics, 
derivative suits flourished as the primary way that 
shareholders could police corporate managers.53 The Supreme 
Court recognized the importance of these suits, stating in 1949 
that they were the “chief regulator of corporate management.”54 
As these suits gained prominence, however, courts and 
legislatures began to regulate them more heavily, concerned 
that many derivative suits were strike suits brought primarily 
for their nuisance value.55 In the early to mid-1900s, several 
states passed new legislation requiring shareholder plaintiffs to 
post a substantial bond before filing suit unless they owned a 
certain percentage of the corporation’s stock.56 This procedural 
hurdle was accompanied by others. Shareholder plaintiffs had 
to establish, for example, that they owned shares in the plaintiff 
 
 51. See Matheson, supra note 29, at 341–42 (recounting the early history 
of derivative suits in the United States and their initial analogy to trust law). 
 52. See Donna I. Dennis, Contrivance and Collusion: The Corporate 
Origins of Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, 67 RUTGERS 
U. L. REV. 1479, 1486 (2015) 
The first shareholder derivative suit to reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court—the landmark 1856 case, Dodge v. Woolsey—arose from 
circumstances in which corporate managers and their counsel 
appear to have orchestrated a shareholder action to secure a result 
that the corporate entity was unlikely to achieve in its own right. 
 53. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of 
Representative Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional 
Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1756 (2012) (“Derivative suits were the 
dominant form of shareholder litigation for most of the twentieth century.”). 
 54. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). 
 55. See id. (noting that these suits were “aptly characterized in 
professional slang as ‘strike suits[,]’” that “were brought not to redress real 
wrongs, but to realize upon their nuisance value.”). 
 56. See Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors 
in Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 305 
(2008) (“[Although derivative suits were initially lauded,] states soon began 
focusing on their potential to be used as strike suit litigation, passing statutes 
requiring plaintiffs in derivative actions to post bonds to insure that they could 
pay corporate defendants’ attorneys’ fees and expenses in frivolous suits.”). 
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corporation at the time of the alleged misconduct and continued 
to hold this stock throughout the litigation.57 
States also gave corporate boards more control over these 
suits. The core precept in corporate law is that boards of 
directors, not shareholders, control corporations.58 Given the 
board’s broad powers, it would normally decide whether the 
corporation should file a lawsuit.59 Derivative suits are an 
exception to this general rule because the defendants in 
derivative suits typically include the corporation’s directors, 
who cannot reasonably be expected to sue themselves.60 Yet, 
courts began to fashion ways for corporate boards to take back 
control of derivative suits under certain circumstances. For 
example, they required all shareholder plaintiffs to make a 
demand on the corporation’s board of directors before filing suit, 
with a limited exception in some jurisdictions if the shareholder 
plaintiff could show that demand would be futile.61 Later, states 
began to allow boards to form special litigation committees that 
could review the allegations in the litigation and to petition the 
court to dismiss the suit if the committee determined that the 
suit was not in the best interests of the corporation.62 
 
 57. See J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership 
Requirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 673 (2008) (critiquing the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement as incoherent and arbitrary). 
 58. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019) (vesting corporate power 
with the board of directors). 
 59. See, e.g., Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1115–16 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(“[Although i]t is black-letter law that the board of directors of a Delaware 
corporation exercises all corporate powers . . . [the law recognizes that] 
directors and officers of a corporation may not hold themselves accountable to 
the corporation for their own wrongdoing.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability 
Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 271 (1986) (“The derivative suit is a striking 
exception to this fundamental principle of corporate law.”). 
 61. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and 
Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1748–50 (2004) 
[hereinafter Thompson & Thomas II] (“As a practical matter, plaintiffs never 
make such a demand on the board, but rather plead that a demand would be 
futile.”). 
 62. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 387, 401–02 (2008) [hereinafter Davis I] (discussing the case law 
governing SLCs). 
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These procedural hurdles were meant to screen out 
frivolous derivative claims, but they did not fully accomplish 
their goal.63 Study after study cast doubt on the value of 
derivative suits. Professor Roberta Romano published a 
well-known study of derivative suits filed on behalf of public 
companies in the 1980s and 1990s, finding that 
“[s]hareholder-plaintiffs . . . have abysmal success in 
court . . . [and] the proportion of derivative suits with a cash 
payout to shareholders (21 percent) is significantly lower than 
that of class actions (67 percent).”64 More common were 
settlements in which the plaintiff corporation agreed to make 
“cosmetic organizational change[s]” to its corporate governance 
practices, which she hypothesized were primarily to justify the 
award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs’ counsel.65 A study thirty 
years later found that federal derivative suits followed a similar 
pattern, with most settlements involving “corporate governance 
reforms that are often untested and/or patently unhelpful for 
both the corporations and their shareholders.”66 
Over time, battered by procedural hurdles and empirical 
criticism, derivative suits largely faded from view.67 Their 
lackluster settlements rarely made the front pages of the 
financial press. Securities class actions stepped in to address 
many of the same types of claims that derivative suits had 
traditionally addressed.68 And the rise of institutional investors 
meant that larger shareholders did not need to resort to 
 
 63. See Thomson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1791–92 (analyzing 
whether Delaware should remove some of the obstacles to derivative 
litigation). 
 64. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without 
Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 60–61 (1991). 
 65. Id. at 63 (stating that “[a] likely explanation” for these settlements 
“is the need to paper a record to justify an award of attorneys’ fees to courts”). 
 66. Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1830 (providing an empirical examination 
of shareholder derivative suits in the federal courts). 
 67. See Erickson IV, supra note 48, at 58–65 (discussing the “deep and 
systematic problems” with derivative suits). 
 68. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as 
Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861 
(2003) (arguing that corporate governance outside of acquisitions and 
self-dealing transactions “has passed to federal law and in particular to 
shareholder litigation under Rule 10b-5”). 
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litigation because they had the economic clout to make their 
voices heard in the boardroom.69 In this new world of corporate 
governance, derivative suits play a minimal role in policing 
corporate managers.70 Today, when the scholarly literature 
mentions derivative suits, it often characterizes them as 
corporate law relics that are largely “dead” or “forgotten.”71 
Merger litigation has followed a very different historical 
path. These suits are not new—shareholders have long been 
able to file class actions to challenge mergers or acquisitions.72 
Until recently, however, they were relatively rare and 
uncontroversial. A study of merger class actions in 1999 and 
2000 found that only 10 percent of deals were challenged in 
court.73 They found that, on average, the takeover offers that 
were challenged in court ended up with a substantially higher 
premium than other offers.74 In a related study, they found that 
“large monetary settlements [were] paid to shareholders in 
many of these cases [and] that these settlements involved a 
substantially lower percentage level of attorneys’ fees as 
 
 69. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation 
Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 
1353–54 (2005) [hereinafter Davis II] 
The ensuing years have seen boards and board committees with 
larger numbers of more independent directors, activism by 
institutional investors, private enforcement of the federal securities 
laws, and white-collar criminal prosecution all emerge as powerful 
deterrents to corporate misconduct. 
 70. See Thomas, supra note 56, at 305 (“Empirical studies show that 
compared to federal securities class actions, or to state court 
acquisition-oriented class actions, derivative suits are running a weak third in 
terms of their importance to shareholders.”). 
 71. See Davis I, supra note 62, at 389 (referring to derivative suits as 
“forgotten”); see also Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1749 n.6 (“Like 
the proverbial cat, derivative suits have been pronounced dead on numerous 
occasions . . . .”); Veasey & Dooley, supra note 18, at 142 (stating that 
commentators have proclaimed derivative suits “dead and gone and buried”). 
 72. See Ann M. Scarlett, Shareholder Derivative Litigation’s Historical 
and Normative Foundations, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 843 (2013) (“Examples of 
representative litigation are found in the ‘earliest days of English law.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 73. See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1254 tbl.1 (2012) (reporting the statistics 
from the study). 
 74. See id. at 1248.   
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compared to securities fraud class actions.”75 Overall, they 
concluded that “we believe that acquisition-oriented class 
actions substantially reduce management agency costs, while 
the litigation agency costs they create do not appear 
excessive.”76 
This rosy picture soon changed. Over the next several years, 
the incidence of merger litigation increased dramatically.77 By 
2013, nearly all mergers and acquisitions were challenged in 
court, often in multiple jurisdictions.78 Even more troubling, 
these cases rarely ended with shareholders receiving cash 
payments or a higher merger premium. Instead, the settlements 
often involved the corporation agreeing to disclose additional 
information about the merger itself or the process that led up to 
its approval by the target company’s board.79 Empirical studies 
cast doubt on the value of these disclosures.80 In light of these 
findings, nearly everyone agreed that “merger litigation [was] 
fundamentally broken.”81 
Delaware took a number of steps to reform these cases and 
protect its litigation franchise. Indeed, Vice Chancellor Slights 
of the Delaware Court of Chancery stated in jest that his job had 
become “pick[ing] up a club . . . and beating the cases over the 
head.”82 The court encouraged corporations to adopt forum 
 
 75. Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 31, at 138. 
 76. Id. at 140. 
 77. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The 
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 476 
(2015) (highlighting that the rate of merger litigation increased from 39.5 
percent in 2005 to 92.1 percent in 2011). 
 78. See id. (presenting data on the rise of multijurisdictional merger 
litigation). 
 79. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 559 (“Although deal litigation is 
pervasive, these lawsuits rarely result in a monetary recovery for the plaintiff 
class. Rather, the vast majority end in settlement or dismissal. In most settled 
cases, the only relief provided to shareholders consists of supplemental 
disclosures in the merger proxy statement.”). 
 80. See id. at 562 (“[W]e find no support for the second hypothesis—that 
is, disclosure-only settlements do not appear to affect shareholder voting in 
any way.”). 
 81. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 610. 
 82. Matthew Diller & Joseph R. Slights III, Lecture, Corwin v. KKR 
Financial Holdings LLC—An “After-Action Report,” 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 1, 18–19 (2018). 
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selection clauses in their charters, ensuring that these suits 
could only be brought in Delaware.83 It announced that it would 
reject any disclosure-only settlement that did not include 
“‘plainly material’ disclosures.”84 And it changed the 
substantive standards of review by which it reviewed mergers 
and acquisitions, giving more deference to deals that were 
approved by independent and fully informed shareholders.85 
For a while, it looked like these reforms would work. The 
percentage of deals challenged in court started to fall.86 Soon, 
however, plaintiffs’ attorneys changed their strategies to 
circumvent these new hurdles. For example, they filed their 
claims outside of Delaware where they could, either by suing 
companies without forum selection clauses or by packaging 
their claims as federal securities class actions, which are not 
covered by many board-adopted forum selection clauses.87 They 
also circumvented judicial review of their deals with defendants 
by casting these deals as mootness payments, rather than 
formal settlements.88 Today, according to the most recent data, 
approximately 85 percent of mergers and acquisitions are 
challenged in court, only slightly less than the high water mark 
in 2013.89 The market for merger litigation changed in response 
to Delaware’s actions, but it definitely did not disappear. 
As these brief histories reveal, derivative suits and merger 
litigation have been on different historical trajectories for the 
 
 83. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (suggesting that judicial oversight would be more effective if counsel 
included forum selection clauses). 
 84. In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 888–89 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 85. See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 
2015) (stating that the business judgment rule is the correct standard of 
review in post-closing damages actions); Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 
A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (holding that the deferential business judgment rule 
is the proper standard of review for actions between controlling stockholders 
and corporate subsidiaries in merger actions). 
 86. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 620 (examining the changes in types 
of suits filed). 
 87. See id. at 628–29 (highlighting mechanisms by which litigants avoid 
Delaware courts). 
 88. See id. at 629 (describing the use of mootness payments in 
shareholder suits). 
 89. See id. at 620 (reporting data from the first ten months of 2017). 
  
THE LOST LESSONS  1147 
 
last several decades.90 Derivative suits were once the 
cornerstone of corporate law, but faded under an array of 
procedural hurdles that gave more power to corporate boards.91 
Merger litigation, in contrast, remains a dominant form of 
corporate litigation, surviving a judicial assault that made no 
pretense of its intention to target these suits.92 
These contrasting narratives create a perception that 
derivative suits and merger litigation are fundamentally 
different. Yes, they come from the same entrepreneurial roots 
with the same basic incentives for the parties involved, but the 
similarities end there. As we will see, however, there is a 
different way of understanding this history.93 These two forms 
of litigation have more in common than it initially appears, and 
these similarities provide an important lesson on the nature of 
entrepreneurial litigation more broadly. 
III.  The Hidden Similarities 
As the merger litigation crisis developed, it was largely 
treated as a new and distinctive set of problems.94 Courts and 
scholars recognized that merger litigation typified the broader 
and quite well-known problems of entrepreneurial litigation, 
but the specific ways that these problems played out were seen 
as unique.95 The disclosure-only settlements in merger cases, for 
example, were a new development, as was the trend of cases 
filed in multiple jurisdictions that have now largely left 
Delaware.96 And one of the primary remedies proposed by 
courts—board-adopted rules to replace the default procedural 
 
 90. Compare supra notes 51–71 and accompanying text, with supra notes 
72–89 and accompanying text. 
 91. See supra notes 51–71 and accompanying text. 
 92. See supra notes 72–89 and accompanying text. 
 93. See infra Part III. 
 94. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra notes 79–81, 83, 88 and accompanying text. 
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rules that govern these cases—was also seen as a new step in 
corporate law.97 
In some ways, these are indeed new developments that 
reflect the specific contours of merger litigation.98 Yet, viewed 
through a broader lens, these developments bear a striking 
resemblance to the changes that occurred in derivative suits 
over the last several decades.99 The disclosure-only settlements 
in merger litigation look a lot like the nonmonetary settlements 
that have long been common in derivative suits.100 The pattern 
of merger class actions leaving Delaware for other state and 
federal courts looks a lot like the filing patterns of derivative 
suits.101 And the decision to give boards more power over these 
cases harkens back to the power given to boards and 
independent committees in derivative suits.102 As we will see, 
this resemblance is not accidental. The agency costs of 
representative litigation often play out in predictable ways, and 
recognizing these patterns provides a foundation for thinking 
about how to prevent these problems in the future. 
A.  Nonmonetary Settlements 
1.  Merger Litigation 
The rise of disclosure-only settlements set the stage for the 
problems that arose in merger litigation. One prominent study 
reported that approximately 80 percent of settlements in 
merger class actions ended without the shareholder class 
receiving any monetary consideration.103 Instead, the only 
consideration in these settlements was the defendant 
 
 97. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 258–59 (“Corporate law has long 
allowed corporations to alter default rules in their charters and bylaws. It is 
therefore surprising that it took corporations until recently to use this power 
to address frivolous shareholder lawsuits.”). 
 98. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 99. See infra Part III.A. 
 100. See infra Part III.B. 
 101. See infra Part III.C. 
 102. See infra Part III.C. 
 103. See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 6 (2013) (finding that these settlements 
resulted in nothing more than supplemental disclosures). 
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corporation’s agreement to make additional disclosures about 
the merger.104 The only people who received any money in these 
cases were the lawyers. Courts regularly awarded plaintiffs’ 
attorneys a fee of $500,000 or more in these cases,105 and 
defense attorneys received whatever fee they privately 
negotiated with their corporate clients. The shareholders, 
however, rarely saw a dime.106 
For several years, however, courts appeared fine with this 
status quo, routinely approving disclosure-only settlements.107 
After all, in theory, additional disclosures could offer value,108 
providing shareholders with more information about the key 
terms of the merger and the process that led up to it. With this 
possibility in mind, along with a strong preference for disposing 
of cases on their dockets, courts permitted these settlements.109 
In doing so, courts pointed to the fact that Delaware had long 
recognized the potential value of non-monetary relief in 
litigation.110 
Over time, however, the situation became untenable. The 
more courts approved these settlements, the more plaintiffs’ 
attorneys filed new cases until nearly every deal was subject to 
litigation.111 The final nail in the coffin was likely a 2015 study 
concluding these additional disclosures had no significant 
 
 104. See id. (discussing the settlement terms in merger litigation). 
 105. See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del. 
Ch. 2011) (“This Court has often awarded fees of approximately $400,000 to 
$500,000 for one or two meaningful disclosures, such as previously withheld 
projections or undisclosed conflicts faced by fiduciaries or their advisors.”). 
 106. See DAINES & KOUMRIAN, supra note 103, at 9–10 (analyzing plaintiff 
attorney fees in merger litigation). 
 107. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 572 (“In short, plaintiffs negotiate, 
and courts approve, corrective disclosure in more than 60% of all 
transactions.”). 
 108. See id. at 561 (acknowledging there may be some residual benefit to 
these types of settlements). 
 109. See id. at 564–66 (discussing why courts in Delaware tended to accept 
these settlements). 
 110. See id. at 566–67 (highlighting the enormous costs that flow from 
allowing cases to proceed to trial). 
 111. See id. at 558–59 (emphasizing the increased frequency of merger 
litigation). 
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impact on the outcome of the shareholder vote.112 In other 
words, shareholders were not changing their minds as a result 
of this new information, challenging the contention that these 
disclosures were material and thus deserved judicial approval 
and accompanying fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyers.113 
After months of hinting that change was afoot,114 the 
Delaware Court of Chancery put its foot down. In In re Trulia, 
Inc. Stockholder Litigation,115 the court stated that it would not 
approve any disclosure-only settlement unless the disclosures 
were “plainly material.”116 The court rationalized this decision 
by noting that “far too often such litigation serves no useful 
purpose for stockholders.”117 Instead, the court stated 
[I]t serves only to generate fees for certain lawyers who are 
regular players in the enterprise of routinely filing hastily 
drafted complaints on behalf of stockholders on the heels of 
the public announcement of a deal and settling quickly on 
terms that yield no monetary compensation to the 
stockholders they represent.118 
This decision was a landmark ruling in Delaware, setting off a 
chain of similar decisions rejecting disclosure-only 
settlements.119 
 
 112. See id. at 559 (reporting the study’s results). 
 113. See id. (“If disclosure settlements do not affect shareholder voting, it 
is difficult to argue that they benefit shareholders.”). 
 114. See generally, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Acevedo v. 
Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730-VCL, 2015 WL 4127547 (Del. Ch. July 8, 
2015) (rejecting a settlement that included modest changes to the deal terms 
and additional disclosures in exchange for a broad release and $800,000 in 
attorneys’ fees); In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 
10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving a 
disclosure-only settlement, but with the warning that going forward the court 
would scrutinize these settlements far more carefully). 
 115. 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 116. Id. at 898–99. 
 117. Id. at 891–92. 
 118. Id. at 892. 
 119. See, e.g., Order & Statement of Reasons at 6, Vergiev v. Aguero, No. 
L-2276-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 2016) (rejecting settlement and 
adopting Trulia into New Jersey law); Bushansky v. All. Fiber Optics Prods., 
Inc., No. 16-CV-294245, slip op. at 7–9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017) 
(adopting Trulia standard into California law); Griffith v. Quality Distrib., 
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For those who follow Delaware’s corporate law 
jurisprudence, this narrative is well-known. It is often told in 
the same familiar way. Disclosure-only settlements became 
common, contributing to the proliferation of merger litigation, 
until Delaware finally addressed the problem in Trulia.120 Yet 
this version of the narrative—a version in which merger 
litigation had sui generis settlement terms, leading to a sui 
generis judicial response—ignores the broader history of 
nonmonetary settlements. 
2.  Derivative Suits 
Nonmonetary settlements have been common in derivative 
suits for decades. In her landmark study, Professor Roberta 
Romano surveyed shareholder lawsuits filed between the late 
1960s and 1987.121 She found that the percentage of derivative 
suits in her study that ended with a monetary settlement was 
far lower than the percentage of shareholder class actions.122 
She also found, however, that a significant number of 
settlements included corporate governance reforms, rather than 
cash consideration.123 In several of the settlements, for example, 
the plaintiff corporation agreed to change the composition of its 
board; in others, the corporation agreed to change its policies on 
executive compensation or self-interested transactions.124 
Romano did not delve deeply into the merits of these reforms, 
but she did state that “while it is impossible to value the benefits 
from structural settlements with any precision, the gains seem 
inconsequential.”125 
 
Inc., No. 2D17-3160, slip op. at 13–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 13, 2018) 
(adopting Trulia standard into Florida law). 
 120. There is more to the story, as we will see in subsequent sections. See 
infra Part III.B. 
 121. Romano, supra note 64, at 56. 
 122. Id. at 61 (“The proportion of derivative suits with a cash payment to 
shareholders (21 percent) is significantly lower than that of class actions (67 
percent).”). 
 123. Id. at 63. 
 124. See id. (examining the nature of self-interested transactions). 
 125. Id. 
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These nonmonetary settlements continued over the next 
few decades. A study of derivative suits filed in 2006 and 2007 
found that the vast majority of settlements included some form 
of nonmonetary relief.126 As in the Romano study, this 
nonmonetary relief was typically a promise by the plaintiff 
corporation to adopt corporate governance reforms.127 This 
study looked at the particular reforms in these settlements, 
drawing on business and finance literature to conclude that 
these reforms were unlikely to benefit corporations or their 
shareholders.128 
Despite this empirical evidence, Delaware has routinely 
approved these nonmonetary settlements in derivative suits. In 
Ryan v. Gifford,129 for example, the court stated that “[i]t is 
difficult to place a value on such non-pecuniary benefits; 
however, such governance reforms can provide substantial 
benefits and are appropriately considered by the Court when 
evaluating a proposed settlement.”130 And in one of the most 
famous cases in corporate law, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
approved a settlement of an oversight case even while 
recognizing that “the changes in corporate practice that are 
presented as consideration for the settlement do not impress one 
as very significant.”131 This history suggests that Delaware’s lax 
scrutiny of nonmonetary settlements in derivative suits, despite 
the empirical evidence casting significant doubt on the value of 
these settlements, may have opened the door for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to try similar tactics in merger litigation. 
This history puts the rise of disclosure-only settlements in 
merger litigation in a new light. These settlements were not a 
historical anomaly that Delaware was unexpectedly forced to 
 
 126. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1798–99 (finding that 85 percent of 
the derivative suit settlements included some type of corporate governance 
reform). 
 127. See id. at 1804–05 (listing the reforms involved in the settlements). 
 128. See id. at 1807–29 (analyzing the effects of purported reforms). 
 129. No. 2213-CC, 2009 WL 18143 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2009). 
 130. Id. at *10. 
 131. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (noting also that the settlement agreement included a requirement 
that the plaintiff-corporation create a new compliance committee even though 
the corporation already had such a committee). 
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confront in 2016. Rather, these settlements were an extension 
of a much longer history of nonmonetary settlements in 
shareholder litigation. Given this history, Delaware should not 
have been taken aback by the rise of these settlements in 
merger cases, nor should it have taken so long for courts to step 
in.   
It is not surprising that nonmonetary settlements were 
used in both merger and derivative lawsuits because these 
lawsuits have the same underlying incentives that make these 
settlements so appealing. As discussed in Part I, there is a 
well-recognized conflict of interest between plaintiffs’ attorneys 
and the shareholders they are supposed to represent.132 
Shareholders (or the plaintiff corporation in a derivative suit) 
want to maximize their recovery from the litigation, while 
plaintiffs’ attorneys had an added desire to maximize their own 
fees.133 In theory, representative shareholders should monitor 
the attorneys to ensure that they are watching out for the 
interests of the class or the plaintiff corporation. Yet these 
shareholders typically do not have a large enough financial 
stake in the case to make this type of monitoring a worthwhile 
investment.134 
This conflict opens the door to nonmonetary settlements. 
Given the lax monitoring by shareholders, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
can trade greater fees for themselves in exchange for reduced, 
or even no, financial consideration in the settlement itself.135 If 
the attorneys bargain for a $1 million settlement, they might 
receive $300,000 in fees. If they can shift the consideration so 
the plaintiffs only receive the promise of corporate governance 
reforms or additional disclosures, they might be able to bargain 
for $500,000 in fees for themselves. Of course, many attorneys 
have strong ethical commitments that keep them from trading 
their clients’ settlement leverage for their own, but the fact 
 
 132. See supra Part II.A. 
 133. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 241–43 (discussing the 
“mismatched incentives” of shareholder-plaintiffs and their attorneys). 
 134. See id. at 241–42 (stating that shareholder-plaintiffs lack the 
necessary incentives to properly monitor their attorneys). 
 135. See id. at 242 (“[R]educed monitoring in shareholder litigation can 
increase agency costs by allowing attorneys to seek a higher percentage of the 
recovery for their fee.”). 
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remains that nonmonetary settlements permit this type of 
trade-off. 
As the above example demonstrates, these settlements are 
also a financial windfall for the defendants. Most settlements 
are zero-sum, which means that every dollar that goes to the 
plaintiffs is a dollar that comes out of the defendants’ pocket.136 
In nonmonetary settlements, however, defendants can get out 
of litigation cheaply by only paying the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. 
Defendants do not care about the allocation of money between 
the attorneys and plaintiffs; they only want to reduce their total 
financial outlay.137 As a result, everyone at the settlement table 
is happy to trade nonmonetary consideration for monetary 
consideration, as long as the judge and the representative 
shareholders do not object (and they typically do not).138 
These same incentives exist in other types of class actions 
as well. Outside of corporate law, plaintiffs’ attorneys frequently 
negotiated coupon-only settlements in consumer class action.139 
In these settlements, the class members received coupons (i.e., 
five dollars off the purchase of a product made or sold by the 
defendants), while class counsel received multimillion-dollar 
fees.140 Consumers often had to follow burdensome procedures 
to redeem these coupons, and class members who chose not to 
do so received no benefit from the settlement.141 
 
 136. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: 
Dispute-Settlement and Rule-Making, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 652 (1976) 
(“Furthermore, when the purpose of negotiation is dispute-settlement, the 
process tends to be a zero-sum game (that is, a contest in which the winner’s 
gains are exactly balanced by the loser’s losses).”). 
 137. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 244 (“[In nonmonetary settlements,] 
the defendants will probably still have to pay some money to the plaintiffs’ 
attorney in fees, but the overall cost to the defendants will be much less than 
if they had to pay both the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ attorney.”). 
 138. See Sale, supra note 34, at 414 (arguing that judges are not 
“functioning as the fiduciaries the law requires them to be”). 
 139. See S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 15–20 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30 (providing myriad examples of coupon class actions). 
 140. See id. (listing the fees awarded in these cases). 
 141. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon 
Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 991, 995 (2002) (“In many cases, the coupons are laden with restrictions 
intended to make redemption difficult.”). 
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Congress set its sights on these settlements in the Class 
Action Fairness Act (CAFA).142 The legislative history stated 
that the provisions related to coupon settlements were “aimed 
at situations in which plaintiffs’ lawyers negotiate settlements 
under which class members receive nothing but essentially 
valueless coupons, while the class counsel receive substantial 
attorneys’ fees.”143 CAFA required attorneys’ fees to be based on 
the value of the coupons that are actually redeemed, rather than 
the purely hypothetical value of coupons that sit unused in class 
members’ drawers.144 They also required courts reviewing such 
settlements to make written findings that the settlement terms 
will benefit class members.145 
The point of this discussion is not that nonmonetary 
settlements are always bad. There have been some valuable 
disclosures in merger lawsuits, some valuable corporate 
governance reforms in derivative suits, and some valuable 
coupons in consumer class actions.146 Nonmonetary settlements 
cannot be reduced to a simple black or white/good or bad 
analysis. Yet these settlements do provide a unique opportunity 
for plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants to exploit the agency 
costs in shareholder litigation.147 By viewing the disclosure-only 
settlements in merger litigation in isolation, divorced from the 
broader history and context of shareholder litigation, courts 
have overlooked their risks. As a result, when these settlements 
started to become common in merger cases, courts in Delaware 
 
 142. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 143. S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 30 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 
29–30. 
 144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2018) 
If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of 
coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney’s fee award 
to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons 
shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that 
are redeemed. 
 145. See id. (“[T]he court may approve the proposed settlement only after 
a hearing to determine whether, and making a written finding that, the 
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members.”). 
 146. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 559 (stating that there is at least a 
slight benefit to the plaintiffs). 
 147. See supra notes 135–141 and accompanying text. 
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were fairly sanguine, approving these settlements with little 
scrutiny.148 Had courts recognized these settlements as a new 
iteration of a broader problem, they might have stepped in 
earlier and used greater scrutiny to prevent the problems in 
merger litigation from getting as bad as they did. 
B.  A Race from Delaware’s Courts 
1.  Merger Litigation 
Delaware has never had a monopoly on merger litigation. 
Instead, these cases have long been spread among various state 
courts.149 Nonetheless, Delaware has presided over a 
substantial percentage of these cases in recent years.150 In 2004 
and 2005, for example, companies facing a merger class action 
were sued in Delaware courts approximately 40 percent of the 
time.151 This percentage dipped between 2006 and 2009, but 
then rebounded between 2011 and 2015.152 During this latter 
period, which is the same period in which merger litigation was 
at its peak, more than half of all companies sued in connection 
with a merger or acquisition faced at least one lawsuit in 
Delaware.153 Even if these companies faced parallel litigation in 
other courts, Delaware had some oversight over most of these 
disputes.154 
At various times during this period, these cases dominated 
the docket of the Delaware Court of Chancery, outnumbering all 
other types of shareholder lawsuits.155 In their landmark study 
of corporate litigation, Professors Thomas and Thompson found 
that merger class actions comprised approximately 80 percent 
 
 148. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 225 (“For several years, judges in 
Delaware decried the developments in merger litigation.”). 
 149. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621 tbl.1 (detailing the percentage of 
merger filings in various state courts). 
 150. See id. (demonstrating that 60 percent of mergers were filed in 
Delaware in 2015). 
 151. See id. (illustrating the percentage of mergers filed in Delaware). 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See Thompson & Thomas I, supra note 31, at 137 (stating that these 
actions made up “the vast bulk” of Delaware court representative litigation). 
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of the breach of fiduciary duty claims filed in the Delaware 
Court of Chancery in 1999 and 2000.156 They concluded that, at 
least for Delaware, merger class actions “have become the most 
visible form of shareholder litigation.”157 The concentration of 
these lawsuits in Delaware made it easier for Delaware judges 
to oversee the changes in this area and create a cohesive body of 
law to respond to these changes. 
Federal courts traditionally played a much smaller role in 
merger litigation. Studies show that, between 2003 and 2007, 
less than 50 percent of merger cases were filed in federal 
court.158 Federal courts oversaw securities class actions alleging 
other forms of corporate malfeasance, but shareholders rarely 
asked them to intervene in corporate mergers.159 Federal and 
state courts thus abided by a rough division of the corporate and 
securities landscape—federal courts focused on disclosure 
claims outside of the merger context, while state courts, 
especially Delaware, handled merger cases as well as other 
cases alleging that corporate directors breached their fiduciary 
duty. 
In 2015, however, the Delaware Court of Chancery handed 
down its decision in Trulia, cracking down on the 
disclosure-only settlements in merger litigation.160 The fallout 
from this case was swift and dramatic, with plaintiffs in merger 
class actions immediately leaving Delaware for other 
jurisdictions. In 2015, 60 percent of companies sued in 
connection with a merger or acquisition faced at least one 
lawsuit in Delaware.161 By 2017, that percentage had fallen to 9 
percent.162 These cases primarily ended up in federal court.163 
 
 156. Id. at 137. 
 157. Id. at 207. 
 158. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621 tbl.1 (finding that 7 percent of 
merger cases were filed in federal court in 2003, 0 percent in 2004, 7 percent 
in 2005, 12 percent in 2006, and 13 percent in 2007). 
 159. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 272 (stating that securities class 
actions are filed in federal court). 
 160. See generally In re Trulia S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 161. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621 tbl.1. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. (reporting that the number of class actions filed in federal 
court increased from 20 percent in 2015 to 87 percent in 2017).   
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Recent data from Cornerstone Research found that, in 2018, 91 
percent of deals were challenged in federal court.164 
Shareholders did not just leave state courts. They have also 
left state law. Traditionally, Delaware law followed these cases 
regardless of where they were filed. Under choice of law rules, a 
corporation’s internal affairs are governed by the law of the 
state where the corporation is incorporated.165 As a result, 
Delaware fiduciary duty law governs a merger case filed against 
a Delaware corporation, even if that case was filed in federal 
court or in another state court.166 As shareholders fled to federal 
court, however, they also repackaged their claims as federal 
securities claims rather than breach of fiduciary duty claims, 
skirting traditional choice of law rules.167 By rejecting both 
Delaware’s courts and its law, shareholders were able to avoid 
Delaware’s scrutiny altogether. 
Today, merger cases comprise a significant percentage of 
overall securities class actions. In 2009, for example, only 4 
percent of securities class actions related to a merger or 
acquisition; by 2019, nearly 40 percent did.168 These figures 
illustrate how plaintiffs’ firms have searched for a new way to 
challenge corporate deals in the wake of Delaware’s crackdown 
on the cases filed in their courts. 
This shift into federal court may not be permanent. The 
federal securities laws provide for increased scrutiny of 
 
 164. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING 
ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2018 M&A LITIGATION 4 (2019) 
[hereinafter REVIEW OF 2018 M&A LITIGATION] (reporting findings). 
 165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977) 
Application of the local law of the state of incorporation will usually 
be supported by those choice-of-law factors favoring the needs of the 
interstate and international systems, certainty, predictability and 
uniformity of result, protection of justified expectations of the 
parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied. 
 166. See Jan Ting, Why Do So Many Corporations Choose to Incorporate in 
Delaware?, WHYY (Apr. 27, 2011), https://perma.cc/ZCE8-252W (describing 
how and why Delaware became the powerhouse of corporate legal authority in 
the United States and mechanics of the Court of Chancery). 
 167. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 246 (explaining that the PSLRA 
overhauled the rules governing securities class actions). 
 168. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2019 
YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2020). 
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securities claims, including heightened pleading standards, 
stays on discovery, and mandatory Rule 11 inquiries, and it is 
too early to tell how this scrutiny will impact merger cases.169 
Additionally, it is unclear whether federal courts will follow 
Delaware’s lead in rejecting many disclosure-only settlements. 
The primary reason that shareholders started filing their claims 
in federal court was to avoid Trulia’s scrutiny of disclosure-only 
settlements, as well as other Delaware cases that made it more 
difficult for shareholders to pursue their state law claims.170 Yet 
at least a few federal courts have adopted Trulia.171 Most federal 
courts have not ruled on this issue, leaving open the possibility 
that they will review disclosure-only settlement under more 
traditionally deferential standards. Until more courts weigh in, 
shareholders still have an incentive to file their suit in a federal 
forum that may be more hospitable to their claims.172 
At the end of the day, however, the move of merger cases to 
the federal courts means that it is harder for any one court to 
exercise oversight over these cases. If these cases were all 
concentrated in Delaware, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
 
 169. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2018) (listing the requirements for securities 
fraud actions). 
 170. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621–22 (discussing the immediate 
effects of Trulia). 
 171. See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725–26 
(7th Cir. 2016) (adopting Trulia because courts have “a continuing duty in a 
class action case to scrutinize the class attorney to see that he or she is 
adequately protecting the interests of the class”); Malone v. CST Brands, Inc., 
No. SA-16-CA-0955-FB, 2016 WL 8258791, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2016) 
(citing Trulia favorably for the proposition that “the public interest is not 
served by a strike suit designed to obtain a disclosure only settlement”). 
 172. It is also unclear how the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) applies to merger class actions. Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). The PSLRA includes several provisions designed to 
crack down on frivolous litigation, including heightened pleading standards 
for certain elements of securities fraud claims, mandatory Rule 11 inquiries at 
the end of the litigation, and (perhaps most importantly) a requirement that 
attorneys’ fees “not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any 
damages . . . actually paid to the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. These restrictions 
mean that the federal courts have their own set of tools to curtail frivolous 
merger cases, at least if these suits are filed under the federal securities laws. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether they will actually use these tools to 
stem the rising tide of merger cases in federal court. 
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could monitor them and shape the law in ways that account for 
broader trends and issues.173 As we will explore, however, if an 
individual court or judge only has one merger case, it becomes 
harder for them to see the case as part of this broader picture 
and to do much to influence this picture.174 
2.  Derivative Suits 
When merger cases first moved into federal courts, 
commentators analyzed this shift as a new phenomenon in 
corporate litigation. Yet derivative suits moved into federal 
courts years ago, and today most derivative suits are filed in 
federal court.175 The earlier move of derivative suits into federal 
court foreshadowed the later trends in merger litigation, 
highlighting Delaware’s difficulty in holding onto its cases. 
The historical trajectory of derivative suits is more 
complicated than the more recent story of merger litigation. 
Shareholders started filing derivative suits in the United States 
in the 1800s.176 The earliest cases in the United States were 
filed in state court and involved minority shareholders 
challenging malfeasance by the corporation’s directors and 
officers.177 
Before long, however, corporations started to embrace 
derivative suits, recognizing that they made it easier for 
corporations to secure a federal forum. For example, the first 
derivative suit filed in federal court challenged the legality of an 
 
 173. See Ting, supra note 166 (explaining why the concentration of 
business law cases in Delaware is beneficial to business). 
 174. See infra Part III. 
 175. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1754 (stating that “most” shareholder 
derivative suits are filed in federal court). 
 176. See Scarlett, supra note 72, at 871 (tracing the history of shareholder 
derivative suits in the United States). 
 177. See, e.g., Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 231 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) 
(alleging that the corporation’s managers had mismanaged the corporation’s 
assets); Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162, 164–65 (1831) (alleging 
that the corporation’s directors had engaged in fraudulent practices that 
depreciated the value of the corporation’s stock); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. 
(n.s.) 68, 68 (La. 1829) (alleging that the corporation’s directors engaged in 
“fraudulent and unfaithful conduct”). 
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Ohio state tax levied on an Ohio bank.178 The bank did not want 
to contest the tax in Ohio state court for obvious reasons, so an 
out-of-state shareholder brought the suit instead.179 The suit 
was styled as a derivative suit against the bank’s directors and 
the Ohio tax collector for failing to challenge the tax in court.180 
The directors did not contest the allegations.181 The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that there was diversity jurisdiction over 
the suit,182 paving the way for corporations to use derivative 
suits to create a federal forum for their state law challenges.183 
Within a few decades, however, corporations became more 
skeptical of derivative suits as more shareholders started to use 
them to challenge management’s decisions.184 At the same time, 
federal courts started to cut back on forum shopping in 
derivative suits.185 In a series of decisions, the U.S. Supreme 
Court criticized corporations for manufacturing federal 
jurisdiction.186 It also created new procedural hurdles for these 
 
 178. See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 336 (1856) (articulating 
the nature of the case before the court). 
 179. See id. (stating that the plaintiff was a citizen of Connecticut). 
 180. See id. at 339 (“[The plaintiff stockholder] had requested the directors 
of the bank to take measures, by suit or otherwise, to assert the franchises of 
the bank against the collection of what he believes to be an unconstitutional 
tax, and that they had refused to do so.”). 
 181. See id. (“To this bill the defendant, George C. Dodge, filed an answer. 
The other defendants did not answer.”). 
 182. See id. at 356 (“We do not know a case more appropriate to show the 
necessity for such a jurisdiction than that before us.”). 
 183. See City of Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 626, 627–28 (1873) 
(using a derivative suit to contest the legality of an Iowa state tax); City of 
Memphis v. Dean, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 64, 74 (1869) (using a derivative suit to 
litigate the legality of a contract between the corporation and the City of 
Memphis); see also Dennis, supra note 52, at 1486 (“[Dodge] implicitly 
condoned the calculated resort of corporate counsel to federal stockholder 
actions to gain more favorable outcomes than they anticipated obtaining in a 
direct suit by their clients in state court.”). 
 184. See Dennis, supra note 52, at 1517 (explaining that corporate leaders 
began to view derivative suits “less as a useful tool”). 
 185. See id. at 1500–01 (noting that corporations used improper practices 
to achieve jurisdiction in federal courts). 
 186. See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 453 (1881) (lamenting the 
fact that “the overburdened courts of the United States have this additional 
important litigation imposed upon them by a simulated and conventional 
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suits, including the demand requirement and the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement.187 
In response to these developments, shareholders slowly 
returned to state court to file their derivative suits. Empirical 
data is not available regarding the precise percentage of 
derivative suits filed in federal versus state court during the 
twentieth century. Nonetheless, the literature suggests that 
these suits were primarily in state court.188 For example, the 
first significant study of derivative suits examined those filed in 
certain New York state and federal courts.189 The study found 
that, between 1932 and 1942, a total of 1,400 derivative suits 
were filed in the two New York state courts (New York County 
and King County) as well as one New York federal court (the 
Southern District of New York).190 Of these 1,400 suits, only 
130—or 9.3 percent—were filed in federal court.191 
At some point over the next several decades, however, these 
cases slowly shifted to federal court. Again, the empirical record 
is incomplete, so it is difficult to tell exactly when this shift 
occurred. Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, the data suggests that 
most derivative suits were filed in federal court.192 For example, 
a study of derivative suits in federal court found that 
shareholders filed four times as many derivative suits in federal 
court than they did in Delaware.193 This study concluded that 
“[t]he federal courts are now the center of a significant 
 
arrangement, unauthorized by the facts of the case or by the sound principles 
of equity jurisdiction”).   
 187. See Dennis, supra note 52, at 1496 (“The Court . . . require[d] 
that stockholders make a sincere demand on a board of directors and receive 
a clear refusal of that demand prior to bringing a federal derivative action.”). 
 188. See Scarlett, supra note 72, at 905 (discussing the findings of a 1944 
study of shareholder derivative litigation). 
 189. See FRANKLIN S. WOOD, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF NEW YORK, 
SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS 6 (1944) 
(reporting the results of the study). 
 190. Id. at 3–4. 
 191. Id. at 4. 
 192. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1788 (postulating that 
plaintiffs filed more suits in federal courts for the purpose of avoiding 102(b)(7) 
in Delaware courts). 
 193. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1762 (reporting the results of the 
study). 
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percentage of corporate litigation.”194 A related study of reported 
decisions concerning derivative suits found that the majority of 
these decisions were from federal court.195 Finally, a study of 
stock option backdating cases filed in 2006 and 2007 found that 
most of the derivative suits were filed in federal court, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff corporation was incorporated 
in Delaware or another state.196 
There are likely two reasons for the shift of these cases into 
federal court. First, derivative suits are often filed in the same 
court as parallel securities class actions.197 Studies have shown 
that shareholder derivative suits often arise out of the same 
underlying allegations as securities class actions.198 A 
corporation that misstates its financial results, for example, will 
likely face a multitude of lawsuits.199 It will face one or more 
securities class actions alleging that the corporation’s public 
filings were false and misleading.200 It may also face a 
shareholder derivative suit alleging that the corporation’s board 
of directors violated its fiduciary duty of oversight by failing to 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Davis, supra note 62, at 419 tbl.1 (noting that, of these cases, 
those involving allegations of corporate impropriety are more likely to be filed 
in federal court than cases involving allegations that a controlling shareholder 
exploited its control over the corporation). 
 196. See Quinn Curtis & Minor Myers, Do the Merits Matter? Empirical 
Evidence on Shareholder Suits from Options Backdating Litigation, 164 U. PA. 
L. REV. 291, 319 tbl.1 (2016) (finding that 56 percent of the cases brought on 
behalf of Delaware corporations were filed in federal court, as were 63 percent 
of cases brought on behalf of non-Delaware corporations). 
 197. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1827 (“The vast majority of the 
derivative suits in my study filed on behalf of public companies were 
accompanied by a parallel securities class action.”). 
 198. See Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An 
Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 68 (2011) [hereinafter Erickson 
V] (“As the data above indicate, a significant percentage of shareholder 
derivative suits are accompanied by at least one parallel lawsuit, most 
commonly a securities class action filed in federal court.”). 
 199. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 53, at 1763 (“Many corporate 
complaints have elements of both breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, so 
substitution of one kind of litigation for another is a recurring possibility, even 
as the reach of each law and its perceived utility changes over time.”). 
 200. See id. at 1775 (providing an example of a securities class action 
alleging that a company produced misleading disclosures). 
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prevent the misstatements.201 The settlements in securities 
class actions are typically much larger than the settlements 
derivative suits, so the securities class actions tend to 
dominate.202 As a result, it is not uncommon for shareholders 
who file derivative suits to file in the same court as a related 
securities class action and then litigate their claims on a parallel 
schedule.203   
Second, as we have seen in merger class actions, 
shareholders may have started filing derivative suits in federal 
court to avoid the scrutiny of Delaware courts. In the merger 
context, shareholders file their cases in Delaware to avoid 
Trulia’s close review of disclosure-only settlements because 
federal courts use their own procedural standards to review 
settlements.204 Similarly, by filing their claims under the 
federal securities laws, shareholders can avoid Delaware 
substantive law that makes it difficult for them to prevail on 
their claims.205 In derivative suits, however, the law is largely 
the same whether shareholders file in state or federal court.206 
The internal affairs doctrine provides that the law of the state 
of incorporation applies to any fiduciary duty claim, regardless 
 
 201. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1819 (“Many derivative suits are 
premised on a board’s failure to prevent or remedy misconduct.”). 
 202. Compare Thomas & Thompson, supra note 53, at 1777–78 (finding 
that few derivative suits end with a cash payment to the plaintiff corporation), 
with CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2019 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2020) (reporting a median settlement in securities 
class actions of $11.5 million). 
 203. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1776 (“These parallels between 
securities class actions and derivative suits reflect a larger trend of 
shareholders filing derivative suits on the heels of filing a securities class 
action.”). 
 204. See supra notes 158–164 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay 
Provisions Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE 
CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES 2 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & 
Randall S. Thomas, eds., 2017) (“Once it became clear that Delaware would 
act to curtail merger-related nuisance claims, these lawyers began to take 
their claims elsewhere.”). 
 206. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 53, at 1763–64 (“Within this 
dual federal-state system, and a state system with more than fifty 
jurisdictions, procedural and jurisdictional rules make it possible to file suits 
in multiple jurisdictions arising from the same act, even if each jurisdiction 
applies the same substantive law.”). 
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of where it is filed.207 Moreover, state and federal courts tend to 
have similar procedural rules for derivative suits, such as the 
demand requirement.208 As a result, forum shopping in a 
derivative suit does not afford the plaintiff a different set of 
applicable laws. 
Yet Delaware courts may differ from federal courts in how 
they apply the law, even if the law itself is the same in either 
forum. As the courts charged to oversee Delaware law, they have 
more flexibility to change course and start cracking down on 
certain types of cases than federal courts sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction.209 Delaware courts also see themselves as the 
guardian of Delaware corporate law, and therefore they may feel 
more responsibility to police frivolous claims.210 Moreover, if a 
significant number of fiduciary duty cases are filed in Delaware, 
they can respond to broader trends in a way that is difficult for 
a federal court that may only see one or two corporate cases a 
year.211 As a result, Delaware courts may often have a more 
skeptical eye than their federal counterparts, causing plaintiffs 
with weaker claims to adopt an “anywhere but Chancery” 
 
 207. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“No 
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a 
State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations . . . .”). 
 208. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(a) (requiring derivative plaintiffs 
to state with particularity in their complaint “any effort by the plaintiff to 
obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and, if 
necessary, from the shareholders or members”), with DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(b) 
(“The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by 
the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or 
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the 
action or for not making the effort.”). 
 209. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 268 (explaining, for example, how 
the second prong of the business judgement rule “gives judges the flexibility 
to override an SLC decision when something feels ‘off’”). 
 210. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 961 (Del. 
Ch. 2010) (“[While] policing frequent filers may cost some members of the bar 
financially, in the long run it enhances the legitimacy of our State and its law 
not to facilitate a system of transactional insurance through quasi-litigation.”). 
 211. See Anywhere but Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and 
Suggests Some Solutions, 7 M&A J. 17, 17 (2007) (“Someone once commented 
on a panel that trying to argue Delaware fiduciary duty cases outside of 
Delaware is like taking Galatoire’s secret recipes and giving them to a 
Jack-In-The-Box short-order cook.”). 
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approach.212 This approach helps explain why many 
shareholders may have chosen to file their derivative claims in 
federal court.213 
As this history demonstrates, derivative suits moved into 
federal court long before merger litigation. This earlier shift 
received less attention than the later shift of merger litigation, 
but putting the two together reveals a broader development in 
corporate litigation. Across the board, shareholder suits have 
slowly moved from Delaware and other state courts to federal 
court, making it more difficult for Delaware to police these 
claims.214 
C.  Board as Litigation Gatekeeper 
1.  Merger Litigation 
Over the past several years, the board of directors has 
emerged as the newest gatekeeper for frivolous merger 
claims.215 As it became clear that Delaware was losing control 
over these cases, the state authorized corporate boards to take 
new steps to bring these cases back to Delaware and possibly go 
even further in restricting these cases.216 In 2010, the Delaware 
Court of Chancery recognized that its efforts to crack down on 
frivolous claims may be causing these cases to flee to other 
jurisdictions.217 To curb this trend, it invited corporate boards 
to adopt “charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for 
 
 212. See id. at 18 (quoting Ted Mirvis of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and 
Katz). 
 213. See id. at 17 (explaining that plaintiffs’ lawyers perceive greater 
settlements opportunities and greater vagary in results outside of Delaware). 
 214. See John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUDS. 605, 607, 629 (2012) (focusing on published decisions in cases 
filed against Delaware companies, merger and acquisition cases, and litigation 
challenging leveraged buyouts). 
 215. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 258–59 (discussing the corporation’s 
role in addressing frivolous lawsuits). 
 216. See id. (explaining that corporations began to “experiment by putting 
other heightened procedures” into their bylaws and charters after the courts 
authorized fee-shifting provisions). 
 217. See In re Revlon, 990 A.2d at 960 (“Perhaps greater judicial oversight 
of frequent filers will accelerate their efforts to populate their portfolios by 
filing in other jurisdiction.”). 
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intra-entity disputes” if “boards of directors and stockholders 
believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and 
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution.”218 Although this 
invitation was focused on forum selection clauses in corporate 
charters, many companies quickly included these provisions in 
their bylaws,219 which corporate boards can typically amend on 
their own.220 Within four years of Delaware’s invitation, more 
than seven hundred public companies had adopted forum 
selection clauses.221 
This development opened the door for boards to include 
other procedural mechanisms in corporations’ governing 
document that make it more difficult for shareholders to file 
certain types of fiduciary duty claims. After considerable debate, 
the Delaware General Assembly banned corporations from 
adopting fee-shifting provisions.222 The Delaware Court of 
Chancery, however, has suggested that other forms of private 
ordering would likely pass muster, at least absent evidence that 
the board had an improper motive in adopting them.223 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 53, at 1812 (“Some companies 
have put forum selection provisions in their charters prior to an initial public 
offering (IPO), a few have submitted charter amendments to a shareholder 
vote, but most of the adoptions by established public companies (still a small 
percentage of public companies) have been via director-passed bylaws . . . .”). 
 220. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (“The bylaws may contain 
any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of 
incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its 
affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, 
directors, officers or employees.”). 
 221. See Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution 
to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 31, 33 
(2017) (finding that, as of August 2014, 746 public companies had adopted 
these provisions). 
 222. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (“The bylaws may not contain 
any provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ 
fees or expenses of the corporation or any other party in connection with an 
internal corporate claim, as defined in § 115 of this title.”), with OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 18, § 1126 (2020) (mandating fee-shifting in all shareholder derivative 
suits). 
 223. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 
2014) (“Legally permissible bylaws adopted for an improper purpose are 
unenforceable in equity. The intent to deter litigation, however, is not 
invariably an improper purpose.”). 
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Corporate boards have responded to this invitation by adopting 
other types of provisions including minimum ownership 
requirements,224 arbitration requirements,225 and bond 
requirements.226 So far, these provisions are still relatively rare, 
but they show the potential for private ordering to curb the 
problems in merger litigation. 
This new role for corporate boards reflects a broader 
acknowledgment that other gatekeepers involved in these cases 
may not be able to prevent these problems.227 Most shareholder 
plaintiffs often lack sufficient incentives to closely monitor these 
lawsuits.228 As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys can make litigation 
decisions that benefit themselves at the expense of the real 
parties in interest.229 Judges are supposed to keep a watchful 
eye on the litigation to curb these problems, but this monitoring 
 
 224. See, e.g., Imperial Holdings, Inc., Amended and Restated Bylaws, 
Current Report (Form 8–K) (Nov. 3, 2014) (stating that directors “need not 
be . . . shareholders of the corporation”). 
 225. See Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Portnoy, No. 13-10405-DJC, 2014 
WL 1271528, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (concluding that the court was 
precluded from deciding whether the arbitration provision was valid and 
enforceable); Katz v. Commonwealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001299, 2014 WL 
9913855, at *2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 19, 2014) (granting defendants’ Petition for 
an Order to Arbitrate); see also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate 
Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder 
Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 33 (2016) (“The 800-pound gorilla in the room 
that has yet to be addressed is whether any states will permit corporate bylaws 
that mandate sending shareholder-manager disputes to arbitration.”). 
 226. See Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 3, 
2014) (amending bylaws to create surety requirements for security holder 
claimants). 
 227. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 239 (“None of the gatekeepers in 
these areas, however, have solved all of the problems in shareholder 
litigation.”). 
 228. See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New 
Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 45 (2002) 
(“Common to all agency problems is their correlation with the asymmetry of 
information between the principal and the agent. The less the principal is 
informed, the higher the agency costs will be.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 
13, at 19–20 (attributing high agency costs in class action and derivative 
litigation primarily to the inability of the class to effectively monitor the 
attorneys). 
 229. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 714 (“Often, the plaintiff’s attorneys and 
the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the 
plaintiffs.”). 
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role is difficult in merger litigation, which presents unusual 
problems not found in other types of litigation.230 Delaware 
judges have an advantage over other state and federal judges 
because they are well aware of the rising problems in merger 
litigation and have a vested interest in protecting the 
shareholder litigation franchise.231 Yet, as we have seen, 
Delaware judges started losing their cases once they cracked 
down, with plaintiffs simply filing their claims elsewhere to 
avoid this scrutiny.232 
Given the limitations of these other gatekeepers, it is not 
surprising that the legal system looked for another group to help 
address the problems with these suits. In theory, corporate 
boards are an obvious choice. They oversee the corporation’s 
business and affairs more generally,233 and they have an 
interest in protecting the corporation from frivolous 
litigation.234 That said, corporate boards have an inherent 
conflict of interest when it comes to merger litigation, as they 
are typically among the defendants in these suits.235 These suits 
 
 230. See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. 
Ch. 2016) (“The lack of an adversarial process often requires that the Court 
become essentially a forensic examiner of proxy materials so that it can play 
devil’s advocate in probing the value of the ‘get’ for stockholders in a proposed 
disclosure settlement.”); see also Griffith, supra note 14, at 20 (“Judges 
tempted to launch a thorough inquiry into the merits of a claim at the time of 
settlement face significant information asymmetries exacerbated by a 
non-adversarial process and an undeveloped factual record.”). 
 231. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 257 (noting the Delaware Court of 
Chancery judges’ expertise). 
 232. See infra Part III.B.1; see also In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 899 
(recognizing that enhanced judicial scrutiny of disclosure settlements could 
lead plaintiffs to sue fiduciaries of Delaware corporations in other jurisdictions 
in the hope of finding a forum more hospitable to signing off on settlements of 
“no genuine value”). The court in Trulia expressed hope that their “sister 
courts will reach the same conclusion if confronted with the issue.” Id. 
 233. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2019) (“The business and affairs 
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
 234. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 273 (suggesting bylaw and charter 
amendments as two mechanisms to shield off frivolous lawsuits).   
 235. See id. at 276 (“Directors know that they are the likely defendants in 
any future shareholder lawsuit. It is inevitable, therefore, that their own 
self-interest will influence their decision making, especially as they consider 
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typically allege that the board members breached their fiduciary 
duty to the corporation by failing to cause the corporation to 
disclose all material information about the merger to the 
shareholders or by approving an inadequate merger price.236 As 
a result, they face their own personal incentives to make it 
harder for shareholders to file these claims, even if these suits 
are in the best interests of shareholders.237 As we will see in the 
next section, however, this is not the first time that corporate 
law has given potentially conflicted directors an outsized role in 
overseeing shareholder litigation.238 
2.  Derivative Suits 
Corporate boards have long played a pivotal role in 
shareholder derivative suits.239 Although shareholders file these 
suits on behalf of the plaintiff corporation, corporate law gives 
the board multiple opportunities to gain control over the 
litigation.240 First, before a shareholder can file a derivative 
suit, it must make a demand on the corporation’s board, asking 
the board to file the suit itself.241 The demand requirement gives 
corporate boards the opportunity to take control of the lawsuit 
 
proposed amendments that will make it more difficult for them to be sued.”); 
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Paving the Delaware Way: 
Legislative and Equitable Limits on Bylaws After ATP, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 
335, 377 (2015) (“In particular, the board’s decision to adopt or to invoke a 
fee-shifting bylaw—or any bylaw that raises the similar specter of 
self-interest— must be enjoined where that decision constitutes an improper 
purpose or is otherwise inequitable under the circumstances.”). 
 236. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 253 (“Traditionally, a shareholder 
challenging a merger or acquisition would allege that the price was too low or 
the terms too onerous.”). 
 237. See id. at 260–61 (explaining corporations’ interest in obtaining quick 
resolutions and cheap settlements). 
 238. See supra Part III.2. 
 239. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 263 (noting corporate boards’ 
historic role as the “primary gatekeepers”). 
 240. See id. at 264 (identifying two procedural mechanisms which return 
power to the board). 
 241. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(b) (“The complaint shall also allege with 
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the 
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons 
for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”). 
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if they wish.242 Delaware courts have held that this requirement 
is excused if demand would be futile, typically because the board 
faces a conflict of interest in reviewing it.243 Second, if the case 
makes it past the demand requirement, the corporation can 
form a SLC that will investigate the allegations in the complaint 
and determine whether the suit is in the corporation’s best 
interest.244 If they decide that the suit is not in the corporation’s 
best interest, they can ask the court to dismiss the suit.245 
The demand requirement and SLC committees give 
corporate boards an opportunity to take control over derivative 
suits.246 The rationale behind these procedures is that the 
plaintiff corporation is the real party in interest in these suits, 
and the board is normally entrusted to make decisions on behalf 
of the corporation.247 Where directors face a significant risk of 
personal liability or another conflict of interest, it makes sense 
to place shareholders in charge of these suits instead.248 If, 
 
 242. See Am. Int’l Grp. v. Greenburg, 965 A.2d 763, 808 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(“[The demand requirement] exists to preserve the primacy of board 
decisionmaking [sic] regarding legal claims belonging to the corporation.”). 
 243. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984), overruled in part 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“In our view demand can only 
be excused where facts are alleged with particularity which create a 
reasonable doubt that the directors’ action was entitled to the protections of 
the business judgment rule.”). 
 244. See In re INFOUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 986 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (explaining that the SLC must determine whether pursuing litigation 
“would be excessively costly to the corporation or harm its long-term strategic 
interests”). 
 245. See Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation 
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1313 (2009) (“If the 
SLC concludes that pressing the claims is not in the best interests of the 
corporation, it will generally produce a written report supporting its 
conclusion and will move on behalf of the corporation to dismiss the claims.”). 
 246. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 264 (“Where possible, however, the 
law tries to return power to the board. This effort is reflected in two procedural 
mechanism—the demand requirement and special litigation committees.”). 
 247. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 
(Del. Ch. 2009) (“The decision whether to initiate or pursue a lawsuit on behalf 
of the corporation is generally within the power and responsibility of the board 
of directors.”). 
 248. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 264–65 (stating that directors are 
unlikely to initiate litigation where the risk of personal liability is 
“meaningful”).   
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however, directors (or a committee of directors) can review the 
allegations in an unbiased way, there is no reason to usurp their 
authority.249 
These procedures reflect traditional corporate law 
principles of board primacy, but they also raise questions about 
whether board members can objectively review derivative 
claims.250 The demand requirement and SLC review are 
premised on the idea that directors are either biased or 
unbiased.251 If they themselves face a significant risk of liability 
or are beholden to the corporation or another defendant, then 
they are biased and cannot objectively review a shareholder 
demand or serve on an SLC.252 Otherwise, however, they are 
deemed independent and can use the available means to regain 
control over the suit.253 
Yet independence is not an on/off switch. As many scholars 
and even courts have noted, directors can face more subtle 
pressure to reject derivative claims, even if they are technically 
independent.254 In controlling shareholder contexts, for 
example, directors may worry that, if they approve claims 
against the controller, the controller may retaliate in ways that 
 
 249. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996), overruled in 
part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (stating that “[t]he demand 
requirement serves a salutary purpose,” including that “if litigation is 
beneficial, the corporation can control the proceedings”). 
 250. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 266 (questioning whether directors 
“can ever act truly independently when it comes to evaluating claims against 
fellow directors”). 
 251. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1308 (listing the various factors that 
are used to determine whether a director is biased). 
 252. See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 
The basis for claiming excusal would normally be that: (1) a 
majority of the board has a material financial or familial interest; 
(2) a majority of the board is incapable of acting independently for 
some other reason such as domination or control; or (3) the 
underlying transaction is not the product of a valid exercise of 
business judgment. 
 253. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 266 (noting that Delaware law 
defers to directors free of conflict). 
 254. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1317 (“[T]here are subtle, perhaps 
unconscious, influences that may cloud an outside director’s objectivity.”). 
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hurt the business.255 More generally, directors may hesitate to 
support claims against their fellow directors, even if they are 
not technically beholden to them.256 As the Supreme Court of 
Delaware stated, “notwithstanding our conviction that 
Delaware law entrusts the corporate power to a properly 
authorized committee, we must be mindful that directors are 
passing judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation 
and fellow directors, in this instance, who designated them to 
serve both as directors and committee members.”257 Under these 
circumstances, the court noted: “[t]he question naturally arises 
whether a ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ empathy might 
not play a role.”258 
Indeed, the procedural record suggests that corporate 
directors rarely support bringing claims against their fellow 
corporate managers. For example, a recent study of 384 SLC 
decisions between 1990 and 2015 found that SLC committees 
recommend dismissal of the derivative claims in nearly 
three-quarters of the cases in which an SLC filed a report.259 
The SLC only recommends that the company pursue or settle 
the litigation in 12 percent of cases, and this percentage has 
decreased over time.260 The SLC process can also consume 
 
 255. See Ann M. Lipton, After Corwin: Down the Controlling Shareholder 
Rabbit Hole, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1977, 1984 (2019) 
Delaware courts continued to remain rock solid in their confidence 
that independent directors could faithfully consider a shareholder’s 
demand that the corporation pursue litigation against a controlling 
shareholder alleged to have breached its duties to the corporation, 
despite their refusal to trust independent directors to stand against 
controllers in any other context. 
See also Da Lin, Beyond Beholden, 44 J. CORP. L. 515, 557 (2019) 
(demonstrating the limitations of a legal framework for controlling 
shareholder transactions that focuses solely on whether directors are beholden 
to the controlling shareholder). 
 256. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1307 (“In questioning whether 
deference to the SLC’s determination is appropriate, courts and commentators 
have often invoked the notion of ‘structural bias.’”). 
 257. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). 
 258. Id. 
 259. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., How Do Legal Standards Matter? An 
Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees, 60 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 2 (2020). 
 260. See id. at 7 (showing a decreasing trend from 22 percent in the period 
of 1990–1995 to 8 percent in the period from 2011 to 2015). 
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considerable time during the course of the litigation, as the SLC 
filed a motion to stay in 38 percent of cases.261 
The demand requirement did not fare much better. One 
study of derivative suits in federal court, for example, found that 
shareholder plaintiffs only made a demand on the corporation’s 
board in 20.3 percent of cases.262 In other words, despite the fact 
that nearly every jurisdiction in the United States requires 
shareholders to make a demand prior to filing a lawsuit, 
shareholders almost always declined to make a demand and 
instead argued that demand would be futile.263 A study of 
derivative litigation in Delaware found a similar result.264 In 
jurisdictions that recognize demand futility as a possible 
justification, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on this 
ground in nearly 50 percent of the cases.265 As this data 
suggests, even seemingly simple procedural requirements can 
force parties to spend considerable time fighting over these 
requirements in court.266   
Stepping back, it is possible to draw some comparisons 
between the roles of corporate boards in shareholder derivative 
suits and merger litigation. In derivative suits, corporate boards 
play a larger role because the corporation is the real party in 
interest and boards typically have tremendous control over the 
 
 261. See id. at 6 (explaining that the motion to stay is “made to permit the 
SLC to complete its work without competing activity from the plaintiffs’ law 
firms”). 
 262. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1782 (“[D]espite the demand 
requirements adopted in nearly every state, the derivative plaintiff did not 
make a presuit demand in nearly 80 percent of the cases.”). 
 263. See id. at 1782 (explaining that there is a “strong incentive” for 
plaintiffs to claim demand futility). 
 264. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1748–50 (“We did not 
find a single example in which the complaint said that a demand had been 
made on the directors.”). 
 265. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1783 (“In the eleven universal demand 
cases in which the derivative plaintiff did not make a presuit demand, the 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on this basis in five of the cases, or just 
under half.”). 
 266. See id. at 1784 (noting that corporations “spend significant time and 
money” fighting over procedural issues). 
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corporations.267 Boards do not have the same power in merger 
litigation because corporations are typically the defendants in 
these suits and therefore they do not have unilateral power to 
block or dismiss the suits.268 Nonetheless, the board’s 
traditionally outsized role in derivative suits can provide insight 
into the new powers recently given to boards to include new 
procedural rules in corporate charters and bylaws.269 This 
private ordering extends the board’s powers to a broader subset 
of shareholder lawsuits, but raises some of the same concerns 
that have long been present in derivative suits, as we will see in 
the next Part.270 
IV.  Uncovering the Lost Lessons of Derivative Suits 
Derivative suits have long been in their own analytical 
silos. Commentators have recognized the common 
entrepreneurial roots of most types of shareholder lawsuits, 
including derivative suits, but the comparisons have not gone 
much further. Yet these suits have much more in common with 
other types of shareholder litigation, especially merger 
litigation, than has previously been recognized.271 Indeed, as 
Part II demonstrated, many of the problems recently seen in 
merger litigation resemble earlier problems seen in derivative 
suits.272 This Part builds on these similarities to develop a set of 
broader lessons for shareholder litigation. It first examines the 
lessons relating to nonmonetary settlements before developing 
lessons for forum selection and the role of corporate boards in 
shareholder lawsuits.273 
 
 267. See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 
1044 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“A corporate claim is an asset of the corporation, so 
authority over the claim ordinarily rests with the board of directors.”). 
 268. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 219–221 and accompanying text. 
 270. See infra Part IV. 
 271. See supra Part III. 
 272. See supra Part II. 
 273. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
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A.  Rethinking Settlements 
The problems in merger litigation can be traced in large 
part to the prevalence of disclosure-only settlements. These 
settlements are relatively cheap, which create incentives for 
defendants to settle rather than litigate, even if claims have no 
merit.274 Defendants’ willingness to settle in turn created 
incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to file an increasing number 
of these cases, leading to the sky-high filing rates of the past 
decade.275 Yet, as Part II.A. explained, these settlements shared 
many of the same characteristics as the nonmonetary 
settlements that have long been common in derivative suits.276 
The actual consideration varies in the two types of 
cases— settlements in merger litigation involve disclosures 
about the planned merger, while settlements in derivative suits 
include corporate governance reforms.277 The availability of 
nonmonetary relief in both types of suits, however, provided an 
incentive for defendants to cheaply settle cases with dubious 
merit, fueling the filing of these claims.278 
The shared characteristics of the settlements in these cases 
provide two lessons for courts and policymakers. First, 
nonmonetary settlements are not a new invention that only 
recently appeared in merger litigation.279 They have been 
around for a long time, and they have had a similar impact 
across different types of lawsuits.280 This recognition should 
make it easier to identify potential problems if a new brand of 
nonmonetary settlements someday appears in shareholder 
litigation or in another type of representative litigation.  
 
 274. See supra Part II.A. 
 275. See supra Part II.A. 
 276. See supra Part II.A. 
 277. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1754 (“[S]hareholder derivative suits 
more commonly end with the parties agreeing to corporate governance 
settlements.”). 
 278. See supra Part II.A. 
 279. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 716 (“By settling, neither side loses 
anything, and both recoup their legal expenses from the corporation (and thus 
indirectly from the shareholders).”). 
 280. See supra Part III.A. 
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 When disclosure-only settlements started to become more 
common in merger litigation, they were viewed as a new 
phenomenon.281 As a result, it took courts in Delaware and 
elsewhere several years to recognize and respond to the 
problem. Indeed, the prevalence of merger litigation started to 
sharply rise in 2009,282 but the Delaware Court of Chancery did 
not adopt a more skeptical standard of review of disclosure-only 
settlements until the Trulia decision in 2016.283 Had the court 
recognized disclosure-only settlements as part of the larger 
problem of nonmonetary settlements in shareholder litigation, 
it might not have taken the court so long to act.284 
Second, the shared characteristics of settlements in both 
types of shareholder litigation may suggest a need for a broader 
response. Under Delaware law, Trulia governs nonmonetary 
settlements in merger litigation, requiring the court to reject a 
disclosure-only settlement unless the disclosures are plainly 
material.285 Yet this scrutiny does not extend to nonmonetary 
settlements in derivative suits.286 Instead, Delaware courts 
routinely approved derivative settlements that include only 
corporate governance reforms.287 The two types of settlements 
exist in wholly separate legal spheres, despite the common 
incentives that underlie them.288 
 
 281. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 564 (“The Delaware courts 
developed the scope of directors’ state law disclosure obligations fairly 
recently.”). 
 282. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 620 (“From 2003 to 2008, litigation 
challenges ranged from 33% of completed deals (2004) to 43% of completed 
deals (2008). There was a sharp rise in the litigation rate in 2009 to 76% of 
completed deals.”). 
 283. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 286. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (approving nonmonetary settlement while noting that “the changes 
in corporate practice that are presented as consideration for the settlement do 
not impress one as very significant”). 
 287. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 
2016) (discussing the “Court’s willingness in the past” to approve 
disclosure-only settlements). 
 288. See id. at 887 (providing the court’s perspective on only those 
disclosure claims “arising in deal litigation”). 
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Perhaps the time has come for Delaware to adopt a version 
of Trulia for derivative suits. Such a standard would not bar all 
nonmonetary settlements in these suits, but it would hold 
parties to a higher standard when seeking court approval of 
settlements where the primary consideration is corporate 
governance reforms.289 Studies have shown, for example, that 
derivative settlements often include reforms that have no 
connection whatsoever to the underlying misconduct alleged in 
the complaint.290 These settlements instead often include the 
same laundry list of reforms, many of which are empirically 
untested or have been shown not to improve firm 
performance.291 
Delaware or other jurisdictions could adopt a new standard 
of review for nonmonetary settlements in derivative suits that 
responds to these specific concerns. As part of this new 
standard, courts could require parties to demonstrate that the 
reforms included in settlements are specifically tailored to the 
types of corporate governance problems identified in the 
litigation. If a derivative plaintiff alleges that the corporation’s 
board of directors abdicated its oversight responsibilities, the 
settlement should include specific reforms that increase the 
board’s oversight over the corporation’s business and affairs. 
Similarly, any proposed reforms should be supported by specific 
studies showing their impact on firm performance or other 
relevant metrics or by a detailed explanation of how the reform 
will be beneficial to the specific company in question. Courts 
may also examine the contractually agreed upon length of the 
reforms to make sure that the reforms have a chance to impact 
the corporation’s governance practices. 
 
 289. See id. (requiring disclosure settlements to be “fair and reasonable”). 
 290. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1811 (“Many more provisions in the 
settlement agreements, however, were not tailored to the specific problems 
alleged in the complaint. Indeed, there was often a striking disconnect 
between the alleged problems and the reforms in the settlement 
agreements.”). 
 291. See id. at 1755 (“Drawing on business and finance literature, this 
Article demonstrates that corporate governance settlements often fail to live 
up to their potential because they include reforms that are unlikely to benefit 
corporations or their shareholders.”). 
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This inquiry would likely be more difficult than the inquiry 
under Trulia. Trulia envisions a relatively cabined examination 
of the materiality of specific disclosures.292 The judge must 
evaluate the specific disclosures in the context of the merger, 
determining whether it significantly adds to the total mix of 
information available to shareholders.293 In conducting this 
examination, the judge can build on precedent evaluating 
similar disclosures in other merger cases.294 In derivative suits, 
however, the inquiry is not that straightforward.295 Derivative 
suits allege a variety of different types of governance failures, 
and it can be difficult to determine whether a specific set of 
reforms will have a material impact on the governance of 
particular companies.296 Nonetheless, starting from a more 
skeptical vantage point and requiring the parties to identify the 
specific benefits of the proposed reforms could help. 
Moreover, courts could decide to use a more searching 
review whenever they encounter nonmonetary settlements in 
representative litigation, even outside of the particular contexts 
of merger and derivative litigation. Again, nonmonetary 
settlements are not always bad, but they do raise particular 
concerns and therefore merit more judicial scrutiny than the 
typical settlement.297 The exact test might vary in different 
types of litigation, but if courts heeded the lessons of derivative 
suits and merger litigation, they might be better prepared to 
 
 292. See In re Trulia, Inc., 129 A.3d at 894 (evaluating the issue of 
materiality in the context of supplemental disclosures). 
 293. See id. at 899 (“[I]nformation is material if, from the perspective of a 
reasonable stockholder, there is a substantial likelihood that it ‘significantly 
alter[s] the “total mix” of information made available.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994))). 
 294. See id. at 894 (“In Delaware, the percentage of such cases settled 
solely on the basis of supplemental disclosures grew significantly from 45.4% 
in 2005 to a high of 76.0% in 2012, and only recently has seen some decline.”). 
 295. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1815 (explaining that many reforms 
in derivative suits are “part of a larger movement” rather than “specific 
solutions to specific allegations of misconduct”). 
 296. See id. at 1822 (finding that many corporate governance settlements 
lacked the types of reforms that have proven impactful on corporate 
performance). 
 297. See Fisch et al., supra note 33, at 561 (“[T]he illusory benefit of 
supplemental disclosure must be weighed against the clear cost of merger 
litigation . . . .”). 
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address new types of nonmonetary settlements, regardless of 
their precise form. 
B.  Rethinking Forum 
Scholars and commentators long assumed that corporate 
and securities lawsuits each stayed in their own jurisdictional 
lane.298 Corporate lawsuits—i.e., those filed under state 
corporate law such as merger litigation and derivative 
suits— were filed in state court, with public company suits 
primarily in Delaware.299 In contrast, securities suits—i.e., 
those filed under the federal securities laws—stayed in federal 
court.300 Over time, this dichotomy started to break down.301 
Scholars observed that Delaware was losing its cases, with 
shareholders filing an increasing percentage of state corporate 
cases in other venues.302 At the same time, some plaintiffs’ 
lawyers started to file many securities class actions in state 
court, exploiting loopholes in federal legislation providing for 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over these cases.303 These trends 
complicated the traditional narrative about forum selection in 
corporate and securities litigation. 
 
 298. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1760 (“While derivative 
suits against public corporations do occur outside the state, the Delaware 
courts capture the bulk of derivative litigation against public companies.”). 
 299. See id. (referring to Delaware as “the country’s most important 
corporate law jurisdiction.”). 
 300. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2018) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to 
federal courts over classic securities fraud claims filed under section 10(b) of 
the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934); see also Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. 
Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018) (explaining that other types of 
securities cases, such as claims brought under Section 11 and 12 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, can be brought in either state or federal court). 
 301. See supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 213–214 and accompanying text. 
 303. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 
U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 350 (2011) (presenting data demonstrating that, after 
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
“increasingly have turned to filing alternative [securities] class actions in state 
court”). 
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As Part II discussed, however, merger litigation and 
derivative suits did not just leave Delaware.304 Both types of 
litigation left Delaware and ended up in federal court.305 
Derivative suits made this shift at least a few decades before 
merger litigation,306 but both types of lawsuits are now filed 
primarily in federal court.307 The scholarly literature has not 
previously recognized this point, nor has it fully explored the 
consequences of having cases that were traditionally filed in 
state court now in federal court.   
In unpacking the lessons now, it is important to recognize 
that the two types of litigation did not follow identical paths. 
With derivative suits, the trend stayed largely under the 
radar.308 No one knows exactly when derivative suits started to 
leave Delaware and other state courts, although at least by the 
2000s, these suits were firmly in federal court.309 With merger 
litigation, this shift was far more sudden and public.310 In 2015, 
of those mergers challenged in court, 60 percent of mergers were 
challenged in Delaware, while only 20 percent were filed in 
federal court.311 Just two years later, in 2017, the numbers 
 
 304. See supra Part II. 
 305. See supra Part III.B. 
 306. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1754 (finding that, by at least the mid 
2000s, most derivative suits were filed in federal court). 
 307. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 308. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 41 
(1993) (finding that over half of derivative and other corporate lawsuits (71 of 
the 139 total suits) were filed in federal courts); Armour et al., supra note 214, 
at 610 n.23 
In hindsight, Romano’s data suggest that the federal courts have 
been a significant venue for corporate lawsuits for some time, 
but . . . neither she nor anyone else focused on this. Romano’s 
original 1991 study does not discuss where suits were filed; the data 
we rely on here are mentioned only in her later book, and only in 
passing. 
 309. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra Part III.B. 
 311. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621 tbl.1 (finding that, between 2003 
and 2015, a significant percentage of mergers were challenged in states other 
than Delaware). Indeed, many mergers were challenged in multiple courts, 
including the Delaware Court of Chancery, the state court in the state where 
the corporation was headquartered, and in some instances, federal court. Id. 
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looked quite different. Of those mergers challenged in court, 
only 9 percent of mergers were challenged in Delaware, while 
87 percent were filed in federal court.312 Merger cases left for 
federal court seemingly in the blink of an eye, while the shift for 
derivative suits was likely slower. At the end of the day, 
however, most derivative suits and merger litigation are now 
filed in federal court.313 
Given that derivative suits have been in federal courts for 
far longer than merger lawsuits, it is worth asking what lessons 
we can draw from this experience. The first lesson is that it is 
easy for cases to fall under the radar when they are not 
concentrated in a single forum.314 Once derivative suits moved 
into federal court, they became almost invisible.315 Indeed, a 
prominent study of derivative suits assumed that derivative 
suits had largely disappeared after looking for these suits in 
Delaware and only finding a few of them.316 After surveying the 
Delaware cases, this study concluded that “there are relatively 
few derivative suits against public companies” and that they 
had receded from the “lofty position” that they had historically 
held in corporate law.317 Other studies referred to these suits as 
“dead,”318 or stated that the evidence suggested that derivative 
suits “are not performing a large role in corporate 
 
Yet, throughout this entire period, of those mergers challenged in court, the 
percentage of mergers challenged in federal court averaged only 28 percent, 
compared to 41 percent challenged in Delaware and 74 percent challenged in 
a state court other than Delaware. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. See supra notes 305–306 and accompanying text. 
 314. See REVIEW OF 2018 M&A LITIGATION, supra note 164, at 5 (“In 2018, 
only 45 percent of challenged M&A deals were litigated in one jurisdiction 
only, a five-year low.”). 
 315. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and 
Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1489, 1492 (2006) (“Derivative suits have been eclipsed in recent years 
by [other] form[s] of representative litigation . . . .”). 
 316. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1749 (finding a “small 
number of derivative suits”). 
 317. Id. at 1756, 1773. 
 318. See Veasey & Dooley, supra note 18, at 142 (discussing how 
commentators refer to derivative suits). 
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governance.”319 In short, once these suits left Delaware, people 
assumed that these cases had largely disappeared and stopped 
paying as much attention to them.320   
It is possible that merger cases will similarly fade from view 
once they are no longer concentrated in Delaware. Here, though, 
the different trajectories of derivative suits and merger 
litigation may play in merger litigation’s favor. Unlike 
derivative suits, merger litigation did not go quietly into the 
night.321 The flight of merger litigation into federal court was so 
sudden and was such a clear illustration of forum shopping that 
it generated significant attention, even prompting judges to 
suggest new ways to bring these cases back to Delaware.322 Yet, 
this attention could wane as practitioners grow more 
accustomed to these cases being in federal court. And once cases 
are scattered across the country, no longer filling up any 
particular court’s docket, it will be easier to forget about them. 
The point here is not that merger cases definitely will fade from 
view, but rather that the legal system should be attentive to the 
possibility given the lessons from derivative suits. 
Second, even if merger cases stay in the spotlight, it may be 
harder to police them now that they have left Delaware.323 The 
Delaware Court of Chancery serves an important monitoring 
role when it comes to corporate law.324 Chancery judges do not 
just narrowly handle the cases in front of them; they keep an 
eye on broader trends and slowly shape the law to be responsive 
 
 319. Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate 
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1473 n.164 (2006). 
 320. See Veasey & Dooley, supra note 18, at 142 (referring to conversations 
that pronounced the derivative suit as “already dead and gone and buried”). 
 321. See Cain et al., supra note 1, at 605 (describing Delaware’s response 
to excessive merger litigation as forceful). 
 322. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (suggesting forum selection clauses as a method for bringing cases back 
to Delaware). 
 323. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 257–58 (explaining that few courts 
outside of Delaware have the knowledge and incentives to properly police 
shareholder litigation). 
 324. See Sale, supra note 34, at 391 (“Judges have the power and the 
responsibility to guard against the agency issues and protect the interests of 
the shareholders and class members.”). 
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to these trends.325 This legal evolution then shapes corporate 
law throughout the country and even the world.326 Will fiduciary 
duty law related to mergers evolve more slowly now that most 
merger cases are filed in federal court? 
Again, the lessons of derivative suits are instructive here. 
When the majority of derivative suits moved into federal court, 
the ones that remained in Delaware looked different than the 
federal suits.327 The derivative suits in federal court tended to 
be tagalong suits to securities class actions where derivative 
plaintiffs took securities claims and repackaged them as 
fiduciary duty claims.328 These suits often ended with 
nonmonetary settlements that offered little benefit to plaintiff 
corporations or their shareholders.329 These suits looked quite 
different than the derivative suits that remained in Delaware, 
which tended to involve more classic breaches of fiduciary duty, 
such as self-dealing or other conflicts of interest.330 These cases 
 
 325. See, e.g., Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & Jason S. Tyler, Docket Dividends: 
Growth in Shareholder Litigation Leads to Refinements in Chancery 
Procedures, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 473, 524 (2013) 
Delaware’s volume of corporate and alternative business entity 
cases, the fact that those cases are litigated before the relatively 
small, but expert, Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court, 
and the responsiveness of its courts, its legislature, and the 
marketplace generally accelerate the development of refined 
doctrine, measured balance, and valuable predictability. 
 326. See  Veasey & Dooley, supra note 18, at 141 (“Delaware has not only 
set the standard for the rest of the states in the United States, but increasingly 
is exercising influence abroad. For the past 100 years, this state has been the 
laboratory where our most fundamental concepts of corporate governance 
have been developed and refined.”). 
 327. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 328. See Erickson V, supra note 198, at 80. (“Many shareholder derivative 
suits may simply serve as tagalong suits to other types of corporate 
litigation.”). 
 329. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1754 (“Remarkably few of the suits in 
my study ended with the corporation receiving a meaningful financial benefit. 
Instead, shareholder derivative suits more commonly end with the parties 
agreeing to corporate governance settlements.”). 
 330. See Thompson & Thomas II, supra note 61, at 1772–73 (reviewing 
derivative suits filed in Delaware and finding that “almost 60 percent of the 
complaints raise principally a duty of loyalty claim” and that these claims 
involved allegations of either self-dealing or mergers involving preferential 
treatment for insiders). 
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did not raise the same agency costs as the cases filed in federal 
court,331 and as a result Delaware courts may not have been 
aware of the problems in these federal cases. It is hard to blame 
Delaware courts for failing to fully recognize the problems with 
these suits when the cases filed in Delaware courts did not raise 
these problems, at least not to the same extent.332 The end 
result, however, was that Delaware has been slower to recognize 
the problems in these suits.333 
There is a risk that the same thing could happen in merger 
litigation. Even today, merger cases have not fully left 
Delaware.334 In 2018, for example, 13 percent of merger cases 
against Delaware corporations were challenged in Delaware, 
suggesting that Delaware will still oversee some of these 
cases.335 Yet, if the merger cases that remain in Delaware look 
significantly different than cases filed in other jurisdictions, 
Delaware judges could miss broader trends. If, for example, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys file more meritorious cases in Delaware 
with the idea that these cases would survive the scrutiny of 
Delaware judges and may benefit from more expert judging, 
Delaware judges may not learn about the broader problems 
happening with these cases in other jurisdictions. This in turn 
could cause Delaware courts to pass up opportunities to shape 
the law in ways that could improve the corporate law more 
 
 331. See id. at 1750 (“The cases do demonstrate some indicia of litigation 
agency costs (for example, suits being filed quickly, multiple suits per 
controversy, and repeat plaintiffs’ law firms), but each of these costs is much 
less pronounced for derivative suits than for other forms of representative 
litigation.”). 
 332. See id. (“[These cases] raise none of the problems of representative 
litigation that can arise in public companies.”). 
 333. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware 
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1094 (1997) (noting that in the 
1980s, many management-led buyouts were likely challenged in other states, 
but only Delaware developed a robust case law on these types of deals). 
“[T]here seems to be a minimum number of cases required to generate a 
reasonably well-specified jurisprudence, and only Delaware seems to have 
passed this threshold.” Id. 
 334. See REVIEW OF 2018 M&A LITIGATION, supra note 164, at 5 (surveying 
the jurisdictions in which plaintiffs filed merger claims). 
 335. See id. (reporting results of the review). 
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broadly.336 One corporate lawyer has openly acknowledged this 
risk, stating 
The success of the Chancery system depends on its exposure 
to, and adjudication of, a large and representative docket of 
governance and deal cases. A court that handled such cases 
only episodically would be more likely to fall victim to the 
‘availability heuristic,’ the cognitive bias that causes decision 
makers to be overly influenced by proximate examples.337 
The situation in merger litigation is further complicated 
because the cases that are leaving Delaware are often also 
leaving Delaware law.338 Any breach of fiduciary duty case filed 
against a corporation incorporated in Delaware will still be 
governed by Delaware law, regardless of where the cases is 
filed.339 As we have seen, however, not all merger cases today 
are breach of fiduciary duty cases.340 Shareholders can also 
challenge mergers under federal law, which eliminates all 
oversight by the Delaware judiciary.341 The restrictions of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act apply to these 
claims,342 but these restrictions are not a perfect fit for the 
particular challenges of merger cases.343 Moreover, these cases 
 
 336. See William Savitt, Leave Merger Disclosure Litigation Where It 
Belongs, 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 173, 182 (2015) (“[A]ssigning disclosure 
claims to federal court would . . . interfere with Delaware’s ability to shape its 
substantive law . . . .”). 
 337. Id. at 186. 
 338. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 339. See Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns 
Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 385 n.37 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that the law of the 
state of incorporation governs issues relating to internal affairs). 
 340. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 342. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2018) (“The provisions of this subsection shall 
apply in each private action arising under this title [15 U.S.C. § 78a] that is 
brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”). 
 343. For example, the heightened pleading standards in the PSLRA only 
come into play if the defendant decides to file a motion to dismiss. Id. The 
defendant may agree to pay a mootness fee, rather than challenging the 
adequacy of the pleadings, to avoid the expense of a motion to dismiss. Id. 
Similarly, the lead plaintiff provisions only help if there are multiple 
applicants for the lead plaintiff position, at least some of whom have a 
substantial stake in the litigation. Id. 
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will be spread across federal courts throughout the country, 
making it difficult for particular federal judges to notice broader 
trends and respond accordingly. 
There is no easy solution to this problem. Derivative suits 
are typically filed under state law, so forum selection clauses 
included in a corporation’s charter or bylaws can bring these 
cases back to Delaware where they will presumably be subject 
to more scrutiny.344 Many federal securities claims, however, 
are subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, so corporations 
cannot simply decide that all merger cases must be filed in 
Delaware.345 As a result, it will be up to federal law to respond 
to the new challenges in these cases, either through greater 
judicial oversight or by new federal legislation or rulemaking. 
The precise solutions can wait for another day, but the 
broader lessons remain. While it is impossible to predict exactly 
what will happen in merger litigation, the experience in 
derivative suits suggests that merger cases could fade from our 
attention now that they have moved into federal court.346 It 
could also be more difficult for courts to police these cases now 
that they are more dispersed. In the end, the legal system has 
not yet grappled with the costs of forum shopping in merger 
litigation, just as it has never grappled with the costs in 
derivative suits. 
C.  Rethinking Gatekeepers 
The final lesson that emerges from the experience in 
derivative suits relates to the role of corporate boards. As Part 
III.C. explained, in recent years, Delaware opened the door for 
boards to include new procedural hurdles in their corporate 
charters and bylaws that make it more difficult to file 
shareholder lawsuits.347 As corporate boards start to dabble in 
procedural rulemaking, however, courts might heed the lessons 
from shareholder derivative suits. In derivative suits, corporate 
 
 344. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 n.8 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (explaining the value of forum selection clauses while noting companies 
may not “wholly exempt themselves from Delaware oversight”). 
 345. See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra notes 315–320 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra Part III.C. 
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boards have long had the power to take control of litigation 
through the demand requirement and the formation of an SLC 
committee.348 This experience provides lessons about the role of 
structural bias in board decision making that may be relevant 
for courts as they experiment with a new gatekeeping role for 
corporate boards in merger litigation.349 
The experience in derivative suits reflects a longstanding 
concern over structural bias when it comes to board oversight of 
shareholder litigation.350 In most derivative suits, as in most 
merger litigation, directors are among the defendants in the 
lawsuit.351 Even if a derivative complaint does not name the 
entire board, the directors who are not named as defendants 
may still be predisposed to allow their fellow directors to avoid 
liability.352 Interestingly, the two procedural hurdles in 
derivative suits—the demand requirement and SLC 
review— handle the risk of structural bias differently, and this 
difference provides insights for merger litigation.353 
When it comes to the demand requirement, courts have 
adopted a black-or-white view of director independence.354 
Demand is excused only if a majority of the directors cannot 
evaluate the demand in an unbiased way.355 In evaluating 
individual directors, the plaintiff must identify specific reasons 
why the director cannot evaluate a demand in an independent 
 
 348. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 349. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1325 (“[E]ven SLC members intent on 
doing the right thing face a serious challenge to their objectivity.”). 
 350. See id. at 1324 n.87 (“Subjects, once induced to espouse a position 
they do not believe, will modify their views to conform to their stated position 
in order to avoid seeing themselves as dishonest.”). 
 351. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1772 (“Consistent with the 
conventional wisdom, these plaintiffs targeted a significant number of 
directors—a median of nine per suit. This number reflects the fact that most 
complaints named the entire board of directors.”). 
 352. See supra notes 256–258 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 354. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 355. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984), overruled in part 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“In our view demand can only 
be excused where facts are alleged with particularity which create a 
reasonable doubt that the directors’ action was entitled to the protections of 
the business judgment rule.”). 
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way.356 The risk of structural bias, on its own, is not enough.357 
There are sound reasons for this insistence on particularized 
allegations. If derivative plaintiffs could establish that a 
director is biased simply by pointing to the omnipresent risk of 
structural bias, demand would always be futile.358 
Yet, even if there are pragmatic reasons for conducting a 
director-by-director examination, these reasons do not erase the 
reality of structural bias. Indeed, conventional wisdom is that, 
if a derivative plaintiff makes demand on the board, the board 
will almost certainly reject it.359 Recognizing this fact, 
derivative plaintiffs almost never make a demand, instead 
arguing that demand is futile.360 And so the first stage of almost 
every derivative suit is a protracted fight over demand 
futility.361 In these fights, courts examine the minute details of 
directors’ business and social relationships, while ignoring 
 
 356. See id. at 816 (requiring plaintiff only to allege specific facts, not 
evidence). 
 357. See id. at 815 n.8 
We recognize that drawing the line at a majority of the board may 
be an arguably arbitrary dividing point. Critics will charge that we 
are ignoring the structural bias common to corporate boards 
throughout America, as well as the other unseen socialization 
processes cutting against independent discussion and 
decisionmaking in the boardroom. The difficulty with structural 
bias in a demand futile case is simply one of establishing it in the 
complaint for purposes of Rule 23.1. 
 358. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 276 (“For obvious reasons, directors 
are not unbiased decision makers when it comes to deciding if the corporation 
should be able to sue them.”). 
 359. See Matheson, supra note 29, at 359 (stating that if the plaintiff 
makes a demand, “the most likely scenario” is that the board will reject it). 
Moreover, if the derivative plaintiff makes a demand, courts view the demand 
as a tacit admission that the board is competent to review it. Id. In this 
scenario, if the board rejects the demand, the plaintiff’s only option is to 
challenge the board’s decision as wrongful, which is an uphill battle. Id. 
 360. See Erickson I, supra note 7, at 1782 (surveying federal derivative 
suits and finding that “despite the demand requirements adopted in nearly 
every state, the derivative plaintiff did not make a presuit demand in nearly 
80 percent of the cases”). 
 361. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 267 (“[T]he demand requirement 
and the SLC process mean that shareholders must run a gauntlet of 
procedural hurdles before they can present the substance of their claims.”). 
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broader structural concerns.362 In short, the review of demand 
futility in derivative suits gets bogged down in details of 
individual director relationships without ever reckoning with 
broader concerns of structural bias.363 
Courts could face similar issues in reviewing new charter 
and bylaw amendments that purport to govern merger and 
other forms of litigation. The Delaware General Corporate Law 
now explicitly authorizes boards to include forum selection 
clauses in bylaws and charters,364 and the Delaware Court of 
Chancery has stated that it will permit other rules as long as 
they were adopted “for a proper purpose.”365 On its face, this 
standard is quite different than the standard that courts use to 
review claims of demand futility, focusing on the subjective 
motivations of the adopting board rather than their business or 
personal relationships. 
Yet, in many ways, its impact may be similar. Both 
standards force the court to do an individual assessment focused 
on particular directors, whether it be their motivations or 
relationships.366 This assessment will have to be repeated in 
every case, as a board’s motivation in one case could differ from 
the motivations of another board even if the underlying bylaw 
amendments are identical. Yet the time and expense of such a 
case-by-case review will still not fully reckon with the risk of 
 
 362. See Matheson, supra note 29, at 363 (explaining that courts evaluate 
whether a director “will receive a personal financial benefit”). 
 363. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817 (“In Delaware mere directorial approval 
of a transaction, absent particularized facts supporting a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim, or otherwise establishing the lack of independence or 
disinterestedness of a majority of the directors, is insufficient to excuse 
demand.”). 
 364. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2019) (“The certificate of 
incorporation or the bylaws may require, consistent with applicable 
jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate claims shall be 
brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State . . . .”). 
 365. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559 (Del. 
2014). The only procedural rule that is expressly off the table are those that 
require the losing party to pay their opponents’ legal fees. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 109(b) (2019). 
 366. See Matheson, supra note 29, at 363 (noting a director may be 
interested “if the director was dominated by a shareholder or director who is 
a defendant”). 
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structural bias.367 Even if a board can articulate a proper 
purpose for its actions, it is still quite possible that the board 
was also motivated by the desire to protect itself from future 
litigation, whether consciously or not.368 A board can easily 
claim that its goal was to prevent frivolous suits or better screen 
claims, without acknowledging that they would be the 
defendants in these hypothetical future suits.369 This standard 
therefore creates a litigation fight at the start of these suits 
without ever acknowledging the more serious concerns.370 
Interestingly, courts have used a different approach when 
it comes to the second procedural hurdle in derivative 
suits— SLC committees. Rather than only focusing on the 
independence of individual SLC members, Delaware courts 
have crafted a standard that recognizes the structural bias 
inherent in all SLC investigations.371 In reviewing an SLC 
recommendation, Delaware courts typically use an intermediate 
form of scrutiny that examines both the committee’s 
independence and process, as well as whether it had a 
reasonable basis for its recommendation.372 Even if the 
committee meets its burden of proof on these elements, the court 
will still go on to apply “its own independent business judgment” 
 
 367. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 263 (“[C]orporate boards have wide 
latitude to use procedure to police shareholder claims.” (emphasis added)). 
 368. See id. at 262 (“It goes against human nature to presume that 
directors will put the corporation’s interests ahead of their own. As a result, 
we should be wary of trusting directors to serve as faithful monitors of the 
corporation’s interests, and much less of the legal system more broadly.”). 
 369. See id. at 264–66 (discussing the conflict of interest which often arises 
when corporate boards evaluate derivative claims). 
 370. See Davis II, supra note 69, at 1323 (“Group membership can be a 
powerful force—much more powerful than we might intuitively expect—of 
influence on how individuals act in settings that relate the group to 
outsiders.”). 
 371. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 268 (“[Under Zapata,] judges are 
supposed to be broader protectors of the corporate interest.”). 
 372. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 928 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (“In order to prevail on its motion to terminate the Delaware 
Derivative Action, the SLC must persuade me that: (1) its members were 
independent; (2) that they acted in good faith; and (3) that they had reasonable 
bases for their recommendations.”). 
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to determine whether the motion should be granted.373 This 
standard expressly acknowledges that complete deference to 
nominally independent directors may not be appropriate where 
the board is considering claims against fellow directors.374 
Empirical studies have shown that this judicial oversight 
matters.375 In states that adopt a weaker form of scrutiny, SLCs 
are more likely to recommend dismissal.376 Cases in these 
jurisdictions also settle for smaller amounts.377 Moreover, after 
the Delaware Court of Chancery increased judicial scrutiny of 
SLC decisions, SLCs became less likely to recommend dismissal 
of the claims, further suggesting that more stringent review can 
blunt the impact of structural bias.378 
Courts might adopt a similar standard of review when it 
comes to bylaw amendments that impose new procedural 
requirements in merger cases and other types of shareholder 
litigation. Given that the directors adopting these bylaw 
amendments could be among the defendants in any future suit, 
they have an incentive to adopt rules that bar even meritorious 
 
 373. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) (“The 
second step is intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the 
criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where 
corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a stockholder 
grievance deserving of further consideration in the corporation’s interest.”). 
 374. See id. at 787 
We are not satisfied, however, that acceptance of the ‘business 
judgment’ rationale at this stage of derivative litigation is a proper 
balancing point. While we admit an analogy with a normal case 
respecting board judgment, it seems to us that there is sufficient 
risk in the realities of a situation like the one presented in this case 
to justify caution beyond adherence to the theory of business 
judgment. 
 375. See  Krishnan et al., supra note 259, at 17 (“[S]tronger judicial review 
of SLC reports seems more likely to help the plaintiff . . . .”). 
 376. See id. (“[W]eaker judicial review of [SLC] reports makes it more 
likely that defendants will win.”). 
 377. See id. (“[I]n states with the lowest level of judicial review for SLC 
reports, we find that SLCs are most likely to recommend case dismissal, more 
likely to have a case dismissed, and least likely to result in a high value 
settlement.”). 
 378. See id. at 16 (discussing the effect of the change of the legal standard 
in Delaware). 
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claims.379 Indeed, among the first procedural rules that 
corporate boards adopted were fee-shifting bylaws, which 
required the losing party in a shareholder suit to pay their 
opponent’s attorneys’ fees.380 Fee-shifting bylaws may make 
sense in other contexts, but they are likely a death knell for 
merger litigation and other forms of representative litigation 
because a shareholder who only stands to gain their pro rata 
share of any litigation proceeds would now be on the hook for all 
of the costs.381 In other words, as soon as corporate boards were 
given the opportunity to adopt new procedural rules for these 
suits, some adopted rules that effectively insulated them from 
litigation.382 And the Delaware courts let them.383 
A better approach would be to recognize the structural bias 
that exists when directors adopt procedural rules to govern suits 
that may someday be filed against them. An intermediate form 
of scrutiny—similar to the standard used to review SLC 
decisions—would take this bias into account and allow the 
courts to examine the objective reasonableness of any new 
procedural rules.384 The examination should focus on the likely 
impact of the rule. Is the rule designed to sort meritorious cases 
from meritless ones? Or is it likely to make it more difficult for 
all plaintiffs to proceed with their claims, regardless of the 
claims’ underlying merit? This objective standard would permit 
 
 379. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 273 (“[C]orporate boards and 
shareholders have already started to use these [bylaw and charter] 
amendments to limit merger litigation.”). 
 380. See id. (“Several companies similarly adopted fee-shifting bylaws and 
charter amendments before they were barred by the Delaware General 
Assembly.”). 
 381. See Griffith, supra note 14, at 29 (“Whatever the effects of a move to 
fee-shifting may be in other contexts, it almost certainly will kill shareholder 
litigation because it would force representative litigants to bear individual 
responsibility for the full cost of an unsuccessful suit.” (emphasis in original)). 
 382. See Erickson II, supra note 16, at 273 (suggesting that the new 
procedural rules discouraged the filing of meritless claims). 
 383. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2019) (changing the law to 
prevent fee-shifting provisions in corporate charters and bylaws). 
 384. See supra notes 371–374 and accompanying text. 
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procedural rules that help courts sort representative claims, 
while invalidating those that do not.385 
Viewed through this lens, fee-shifting bylaws are obviously 
suspect, as they discourage all representative claims. Forum 
selection clauses, on the other hand, are likely fine, at least if 
they direct claims into a court with a reasonable relationship to 
the claims.386 With these procedural tools, therefore, the 
standard mimics what Delaware has already done by statute.387 
This approach, however, could also apply to new types of 
procedural rules that future boards might adopt, including 
heightened pleading standards, limits on discovery, and new 
standing rules.388 At the same time, it does not require the 
plaintiff to unearth evidence that any particular directors 
adopted the rule with a nefarious purpose, nor does it impugn 
the integrity of particular directors. It simply recognizes that we 
all have a natural tendency toward self-interest that, in this 
particular context, requires greater oversight by courts.389 
More broadly, this approach would provide a foundation 
that future courts can use when deciding whether corporate 
boards should have greater power to influence shareholder 
lawsuits. It is unlikely that we have seen the last attempt by 
corporate boards to gain control over these suits. Rather than 
crafting a standard of review anew every time boards take this 
step, courts should recognize the familiar themes at play and 
use a similar standard. This approach will bring the lost lessons 
 
 385. Other scholars have also advocated an intermediate level of scrutiny 
for this type of bylaw amendment, although they propose a different test. See, 
e.g., Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 235, at 362 (“In our view, a 
proportionate and reasonable fee-shifting bylaw that responds to a legitimate 
threat to corporate welfare is one that provides for two-way shifting of 
reasonable fees for frivolous litigation as determined by a neutral arbiter.”). 
 386. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (encouraging corporation to include forum selection clauses in their 
bylaws and charters). 
 387. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (banning fee-shifting provisions); 
id. at § 115 (authorizing forum selection clauses). 
 388. See, e.g., Jessica Erickson, Investing in Corporate Procedure, 99 B.U. 
L. REV. 1367, 1371–72 (2019) (“The field of civil procedure offers specific 
solutions to the problems of agency costs and cost asymmetries seen in 
shareholder litigation.”). 
 389. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text. 
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of shareholder litigation out of the shadows to benefit future 
shareholder lawsuits. 
V.  Conclusion 
Derivative suits are often viewed as the sleepier cousin of 
other, more interesting types of shareholder litigation. As the 
parties in merger litigation experimented with new types of 
settlements, fled to federal courts, and then pushed back on 
board control over these lawsuits, derivative suits stayed largely 
in the background. Yet, derivative suits had already survived 
many of these same developments.390 Derivative suits have 
their own form of nonmonetary settlements, they have also fled 
to federal court, and they are also subject to board review.391 
These changes happened more slowly and received less 
attention than in merger litigation, but the changes themselves 
are remarkably similar. 
These parallels provide lessons in the broader issues facing 
shareholder litigation.392 The recent events in merger litigation 
are not unique. Instead, they are more common challenges that 
have arisen before and could arise again in other types of 
litigation.393 Recognizing this fact should make courts and 
policymakers better prepared if similar issues arise in the 
future. Courts could develop, for example, broader rules to 
govern nonmonetary settlements, rather than addressing these 
settlements on a more ad hoc basis in different types of 
litigation.394 They could also face more directly the challenges 
that inevitably arise when boards of directors have the power to 
review claims that may someday be filed against them.395 By 
uncovering the lost lessons of derivative suits, the legal system 
will be ready if history repeats itself again. 
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